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THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
ANN C. HODGES*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the United States Supreme Court en-
dorsed the use of arbitration to resolve contractual disputes in private
sector labor relations, and limited judicial involvement in the arbitration
process.' Pursuant to the national labor policy expressed in the Trilogy
favoring arbitration, arbitration has resolved contractual disputes be-
tween private sector employers and unions, largely without resort to the
courts.
2
The Trilogy principles have restrained court involvement in the arbi-
tration process by imposing a policy of judicial deference to arbitration. 3
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a very limited exception to
the Trilogy's broad deference to arbitration, holding that the courts
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1973, University of North Car-
olina - Chapel Hill; M.A., 1974, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; J.D., 1981, Northwest-
ern University. The author thanks Professors John Paul Jones and Martin H. Malin for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article and acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Judi
Chartier, Class of 1992, University of Richmond Law School.
1. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See Craver, Labor Arbitration As A Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1990), for a thorough discussion of the judicial
application of the Trilogy principles in the private sector.
2. See Feuille & Leroy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts" Facts and Figures,
45 ARB. J. 35, 46 (Mar. 1990); Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
922-23 (1979). Getman points out that there are strong incentives for the parties to accept arbitra-
tion awards which were present even before the Trilogy made it more difficult to challenge the
awards. These incentives include the costs of litigation, the disruptive effect of continuing disputes
on the collective bargaining relationship, and the knowledge that the contract can be modified in
future negotiations to eliminate the impact of an adverse award. Public management may have
stronger incentives to resist arbitration initially and to avoid compliance with adverse awards, how-
ever. See Abrams, The Power Issue in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 67 MINN. L. REV. 261
(1982). Abrams notes that prearbitration and postarbitration arbitrability arguments provide an
opportunity for public employers to attempt to preserve their right to consider political factors in
making decisions. Id. at 278.
3. See American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 567-68 (in deciding whether the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement agreed to arbitrate a dispute the courts should not weigh the merits of the
grievance, for that is the function of the arbitrator); Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582 (a court should
order arbitration of a grievance "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage." (footnote omitted)); Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 599 (the
interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator and courts should enforce the award so long as it
draws its essence from the agreement, even if the court would have interpreted the contract
differently).
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should not enforce an arbitration award that violates public policy.4
Public policy challenges to arbitration awards have become increasingly
common in the private sector, 5 and because the Supreme Court has not
defined the scope of the exception with precision, 6 courts reviewing
awards on public policy grounds have disagreed over whether an award
may be set aside on public policy grounds where the award neither vio-
lates positive law nor requires the employer to violate positive law.7
In the thirty years since the United States Supreme Court decided
the Steelworkers Trilogy,8 collective bargaining in the public sector has
grown exponentially. 9 Increasingly, collective bargaining agreements in
the public sector have incorporated the grievance and arbitration model
from the private sector for resolution of disputes over the meaning and
4. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 766 (1983). This exception is based on the general rule that a court will not enforce a
contract which is unlawful or in violation of public policy. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
5. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 2, at 44. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists
Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (court rejected public policy challenge to award
reinstating negligent auto mechanic because no established public policy was violated by the award),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946 (1990); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665 (1 1th
Cir. 1988) (award reinstating pilot who had flown an aircraft while intoxicated was vacated because
it violated established public policy), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989); Flushing Hospital and Medi-
cal Center v. Local 1199, Drug, Hospital and Health Care Employees Union, 685 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.
N.Y. 1988) (award reinstating nursing attendant who had changed an intravenous bag when a nurse
was not available did not violate public policy).
6. The public policy must be "well-defined and dominant," W R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, and
"the violation of such a policy must be clearly shown," Misco, 484 U.S. at 43. The Court in Misco
expressly declined to address the union's argument that a court may refuse to enforce an award only
when the award violates positive law or compels an employer to engage in conduct that would
violate such law, Misco, 484 U.S. at 45, n.12, but noted that, in W. R. Grace, the Court examined the
award to determine whether there was an explicit conflict with existing laws, not whether the award
comported with general considerations of public interests. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43.
7. Compare Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(court applied narrow scope of review for public policy, refusing to vacate arbitrator's award rein-
stating pilot who had served as a crew member of a plane while intoxicated since the law does not
prohibit employment of reformed alcoholics as pilots), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988) and Inter-
state Brands Corp. v. Chauffeurs, Local 135, 909 F.2d 885, (6th Cir. 1990) (reinstatement of truck
driver convicted of driving while intoxicated off-duty and arrested for off-duty drug possession does
not conflict with any law or legal precedent), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1104 (1991) with Iowa Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987)
(court can overturn an arbitrator's award without any finding of illegality) and Georgia Power Co. v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (award reinstating
drug user vacated because it violated public policy against drug use by individuals who operate
potentially hazardous machinery found in OSHA provisions requiring safe workplace, criminal laws
against drug use, and laws that exclude drug abusers from the definition of "handicapped"), aff'd,
896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).
8. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
9. Coleman, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: Status, Issues and Problems, 17 J. COL-
LECTIVE NEGOTIATIONs 89, 89 (1988).
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application of the agreement. 10 Indeed, some state statutes authorizing
collective bargaining for public employees mandate that grievance and/
or arbitration procedures be included in each collective bargaining
agreement. "
As the use of arbitration in the public sector has increased, the ap-
plicability to the public sector of the Trilogy's deference to arbitration has
been a recurring issue. Judicial involvement in public sector arbitration
has varied by, and within, jurisdictions. In some cases, public sector em-
ployers have avoided arbitration by invoking the argument that the sov-
ereign cannot delegate decisionmaking power. 12 In other cases, however,
this argument has been rejected and the rationale supporting the pre-
sumption of arbitrability' 3 in the private sector has persuaded the courts
to order public employers to arbitration.' 4 Similarly, in reviewing arbi-
tration awards, some courts have been quick to overturn arbitrators' de-
cisions with which they disagree.' 5 Other courts have adopted and
followed the private sector policy, enforcing the arbitrator's award so
long as it "draws its essence"' 6 from the collective bargaining
agreement. 17
The public policy argument for judicial involvement in arbitration
10. Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEx. L. REV.
329 (1980).
11. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 1710(c) (1986); MINN. STAT. § 179A.20(4) (Supp.
1990); ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1608 (1986); FLA. STAT.
§ 447.401 (Supp. 1990).
12. See, e.g., Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1978); Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teach-
ers Ass'n, 50 A.D.2d 24, 376 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975), aff'd 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976).
13. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 585 (1960)
the Supreme Court created a presumption in favor of arbitrability. See AT&T Technologies v. Com-
munications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) ("[w]here the contract contains an arbi-
tration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability .... ).
14. See, e.g., Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. No. 6 v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School
Teachers' Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 595, 227 N.W.2d 500, 506 (1975) (relying on the Trilogy principles
to order arbitration where it could not be said "with positive assurance" that the arbitration clause
was not "susceptible of an interpretation" that covered the dispute (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363
U.S. at 582-83)).
15. See, eg., City of Hartford v. Local 760, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 6 Conn. App. 11, 502
A.2d 429 (1986) (award reinstating firefighter who allegedly was involved in a bank robbery was
vacated because arbitrator exceeded authority); County College of Morris Staff Ass'n v. County
College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985) (court vacated award because arbitrator read
the contract to require progressive discipline prior to discharge).
16. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
17. See, e.g., Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich. App. 637, 242 NW.2d 478 (1976).
In some states, the courts have adopted the Trilogy standards expressly, see City of Des Moines v.
Central Iowa Pub. Employees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa
1989), while in others the courts use state statutory standards modeled after the United States Arbi-
tration Act. See Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County,
Soc'y of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977).
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has played a prominent role in the public sector. It has been argued
that, regardless of the scope of the public policy exception to judicial
deference in the private sector, judicial deference in the public sector
must be strictly limited by public policy because the public employer has
a statutory mandate to supply public services.18 In addition, public sec-
tor collective bargaining exists in a complex and diverse statutory envi-
ronment which provides fertile ground for arguments based on the public
policy exception.' 9 Indeed, public policy arguments for avoiding arbitra-
tion or voiding arbitration awards have a long history in the public sec-
tor, and pervade the entire spectrum of court involvement in
arbitration.20
This article will examine the role of the Trilogy principles, including
the public policy exception, in judicial enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in the public sector. First the article will review the applicable law
in the private sector regarding judicial arbitration enforcement. Then,
the article will discuss the role of the courts in public sector arbitration,
concluding that while courts frequently pay lip service to the Trilogy
principles, in reality they often fail to apply them. Finally, the article
will analyze the arguments for and against application of the deferential
Trilogy standards in the public sector in light of the distinctive character-
istics of public sector labor relations, and make a recommendation as to
the appropriate scope of judicial involvement in public sector arbitration.
Particular emphasis will be placed on the public policy arguments
for judicial involvement in arbitration because of their significance in the
public sector. In contrast to the private sector, where public policy argu-
ments are raised primarily in the context of judicial review of arbitration
awards, public policy arguments in the public sector frequently are raised
18. See United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 481 U.S. 1301 (1987)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Kearny PBA, Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 217, 405
A.2d 393, 398 (1979) (In the public sector, "public policy demands that inherent in the arbitrator's
guidelines are the public interest, welfare and other pertinent statutory criteria.").
19. Grodin, Judicial Response to Public-Sector Arbitration, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING
224, 226 (1978); Toole, Judicial Activism in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration: A Study of Recent
Developments, 33 ARB. J. 6, 6 (Sept. 1978) ("[Q]uestions of public policy in the public sector are
much broader than in the private.") See Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in
Arbitration-1976, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI-
TRATORS 97 (1976) for an argument that the judicial deference to arbitration in the private sector
will be eroded by the increase in external law applicable to private sector employment.
20. The public policy argument has appeared in pre-arbitral cases in challenges to arbitrability
and delegation, and has been used in post-arbitral cases as a challenge to the award. See Mastriani &
Anderson, Arbitrability in the Public Sector, 3 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 60-1, 60-11
(1983); Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d 278
(1978) (pre-arbitration challenge to arbitrability of teacher transfers based on claim of nondelegabil-
ity); Watertown Police Union, Local 541 v. Town of Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 555 A.2d 406
(1989) (arbitration award challenged on public policy grounds).
[Vol. 66:631
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to avoid compliance with agreements to arbitrate. Even where public pol-
icy arguments are not expressly raised, courts appear to be influenced by
their views of public policy in reviewing the merits of an arbitrator's
award. 21 Accordingly, the article includes a recommendation regarding
the appropriate scope of the public policy exception in the public sector.
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PRIVATE SECTOR ARBITRATION
Arbitration of labor disputes in the private sector has a lengthy his-
tory. 22 While arbitration has been used to a limited extent to resolve
impasses in collective bargaining in the private sector, 23 its use to decide
disputes over the meaning and application of collective bargaining agree-
ments is, and has been, widespread.24 Arbitration plays a central role in
the national labor policy. 2 5 Arbitration is not a "substitute for litiga-
tion," as in the commercial context, but a "substitute for industrial
strife."' 26 Additionally, it is an extension of the collective bargaining pro-
cess, the method by which meaning and content are given to the negoti-
ated agreement. 27 The arbitrator functions as the parties' "contract
reader", a "joint alter ego for the purpose of striking whatever supple-
mentary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated
omissions of the initial agreement."128
The collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract; it cre-
ates a "system of industrial self-government."129 The grievance and arbi-
tration procedure is the heart of this system.30 Decisions of labor
arbitrators are not limited by the language of the contract. Rather, the
arbitrators are chosen because of their knowledge of the industrial com-
21. See discussion of State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 91 N.J. 464, 453 A.2d 176 (1982)
infra at notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
22. See Coleman, supra note 9, at 89-90.
23. See DeWolf, The Enforcement of the Labor Arbitration Agreement in the Public Sector - the
New York Experience, 39 ALB. L. REV. 393, 398 (1975). See also Craver, The Judicial Enforcement
of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B.C.L. REV. 557, 557 (1980) ("The impasse resolution tech-
nique most often used in the private sector where parties are unable to resolve a bargaining impasse
through regular negotiations involves resort to a work stoppage.").
24. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOT. & CoNT. (BNA) § 51:1 (Basic Patterns: Griev-
ances and Arbitration) (Feb. 9, 1989). A survey of some 400 sample contracts by BNA revealed that
approximately 98% contained an arbitration provision for resolving interpretation and application
disputes.
25. "A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration
of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 578, 581.
28. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977).
29. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580.
30. Id. at 581.
1990]
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mon law and they are expected to rely on that knowledge in issuing a
decision.31
These observations about the nature of grievance arbitration and its
primacy in the scheme of national labor policy led the Supreme Court, in
the Trilogy, to limit the role of the courts in arbitration.32 When there is
a dispute over whether a particular matter is subject to arbitration, it is
for the court to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate.33 Con-
sistent with the policy favoring arbitration, however, the Supreme Court
stated in Warrior & Gulf'
The judicial inquiry under section 301 must be strictly confined to
the question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the
grievance or did agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award
he made. An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be
denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitra-
tion clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the as-
serted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. 34
The Court thus established a presumption in favor of arbitrability. 35
Moreover, in determining whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, the
courts must avoid becoming entangled in the merits of the grievance; if
there is an agreement to arbitrate, the decision on the merits is for the
arbitrator. 36 And, according to the Court, "[t]he processing of even friv-
olous claims may have therapeutic values . . .37
The courts have a similarly limited role in reviewing an arbitrator's
award. In a challenge to an arbitration award, like a challenge to arbi-
trability, the court must avoid review of the merits. 38 Such review would
undermine the important goal of arbitration as a final and binding resolu-
tion of contract disputes. 39 So long as the arbitrator's award "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement", the award must be
enforced. 4° Even where the arbitrator errs in the interpretation of the
contract, it is not for the court to second-guess the arbitrator's
interpretation. 41
31. Id. at 581-82; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960).
32. The role of the courts was defined initially in the Steelworkers Trilogy and further explicated
in W. R. Grace & Co. v. International Union of United Rubber Workers, Local Union 759, 461 U.S.
757, 764-66 (1983) and United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987).
33. Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 582.
34. Id. at 582-83.
35. AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).
36. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568.
37. Id.
38. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
[Vol. 66:631
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As noted previously, however, the Supreme Court has recognized an
exception to the general rule of according finality to the arbitrator's
award where the award conflicts with public policy. 42 To date, however,
the Court's decisions have not identified the precise limits of the public
policy exception.4 3
The lower federal courts have adopted two different interpretations
of the public policy exception." Some courts have limited the exception
to situations in which the award is in violation of the law or requires the
employer to violate the law.45 These courts rely on the language from
United Paper Workers Int'l Union v. Misco that states (referring to the
Court's earlier decision in W. R. Grace v. Rubber Workers): "[o]ur deci-
sion turned on our examination of whether the award created any ex-
plicit conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents' rather than an
assessment of 'general considerations of supposed public interests.' "46
Relying on this and other language from these two decisions, courts have
refused to overturn arbitration awards that are not in direct violation of
existing statutory or case law, asserting that any other formulation is so
overbroad and unprincipled as to permit wholesale destruction of the na-
tional policy favoring arbitration.4 7
Other courts have employed a broader notion of public policy.
These courts will invalidate awards that conflict with policies underlying
statutory or decisional law, despite the fact that neither the arbitrator's
decision nor the employer's compliance with that decision would violate
any law.4 8 Many of the challenged cases have involved an employer's
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision." United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38
(1987).
42. See W. R. Grace v. International Union of United Rubber Workers, Local Union 759, 461
U.S. 757 (1983); Misco, 484 U.S. 29.
43. See Hexter, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: How the Public Policy Exception
Cases Ignore the Public Policies Underlying Labor Arbitration, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 77, 93 (1989).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239,
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988) (court refused to "impose [its] own brand
of justice" as the narrow public policy exception did not apply since there was no legal proscription
on reinstatement of letter carrier convicted of unlawful delay of the mail); United States Postal
Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 789 F.2d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (court recognized
established public policy of consistent postal service operations but held that this policy was not
implicated by the facts of the case); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,
789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (public policy exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit
intrusive judicial review of arbitration).
46. Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, quoting W R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
47. See cases cited supra note 45.
48. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 540 v. Great Western Food, 712 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983) (arbitration award reinstating employee who
admitted driving company truck after drinking vacated on public policy grounds); Georgia Power
Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 896
1990]
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refusal to comply with an arbitrator's award reinstating a discharged em-
ployee on the ground that reinstatement would violate public policy. 49
An example, drawn from two virtually identical cases with opposite re-
sults, will illustrate the two approaches of the courts.50 An airline pilot is
discharged by a commercial airline for serving as a member of the flight
crew of an early morning commercial flight after drinking alcohol for
several hours the night before the flight. A blood alcohol test adminis-
tered at the conclusion of the two hour flight reveals a blood alcohol level
in excess of that permitted by FAA regulations and in excess of the level
that creates a presumption of intoxication under the state law that pro-
hibits driving while intoxicated. The arbitrator orders the employer to
reinstate the pilot assuming FAA certification to fly. The arbitrator's
decision sets forth two bases for reinstatement. First, the employer has
not terminated other employees with alcohol problems but instead of-
fered them the opportunity to enter alcohol rehabilitation; second, the
discharged pilot had an unblemished record in fifteen years of employ-
ment and successfully completed alcohol rehabilitation after the termina-
tion. The employer challenges the award claiming that reinstatement of
the pilot would violate the strong public policy against operation of an
aircraft while intoxicated, a policy designed to protect the public safety.
A narrow view of the public policy exception would require that the
court uphold the award because reinstatement of the pilot would not vio-
late positive law. No law prohibits the employment of pilots who have
previously operated aircraft while intoxicated. 5' A broader view of pub-
lic policy, however, would support overturning the arbitrator's award,
for there is a strong public policy, and numerous laws and regulations,
F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990) (arbitration award reinstating drug abuser vacated on public policy
grounds).
49. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239
(employer challenged award reinstating letter carrier convicted of unlawful delay of the mail assert-
ing a violation of public policy); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712 F.2d at 122 (employer challenged
arbitration award reinstating employee who drove company truck after drinking alcohol asserting a
violation of public policy); Georgia Power Co., 707 F. Supp. at 531 (employer challenged arbitration
award reinstating drug abuser on public policy grounds).
50. Compare Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(arbitrator's reinstatement of airline pilot who served as copilot within 24 hours of consuming alco-
hol when his blood alcohol level was .13%, which violated company rules and FAA regulations, did
not violate public policy), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988) with Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665 (11 th Cir. 1988) (arbitrator's reinstatement of pilot who served as pilot in com-
mand within 8 hours of consuming alcohol when his blood alcohol content was .13 grams, which
violated company rules and FAA regulations, violated public policy), cert denied, 493 U.S. 871
(1989).
51. Cf. Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83-85. In rejecting the employer's public policy argu-
ment in Northwest Airlines, the court noted that the employer had a policy that allowed reformed
alcoholics to fly as pilots. Id. at 83.
[Vol. 66:631
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prohibiting operation of an aircraft while intoxicated. 52
There are persuasive arguments for both views of the public policy
exception. Concededly, a court should be permitted to vacate an arbitra-
tor's award that is unlawful. 53 Supporters of a broad reading of the pub-
lic policy exception rely on the well-established principle that a court will
not enforce a contract that violates law or public policy. 54 Although
public policy is expressed in the law, an award need not be in direct
violation of positive law to violate public policy.55 Further, it is the func-
tion of the courts to enforce public policy and, thus, the courts are per-
forming an appropriate role in reviewing arbitration awards for
compliance with public policy. 56
Critics of the expansive public policy exception argue that it endan-
gers the finality of arbitration, which is crucial to national labor policy.5 7
In the absence of finality of awards, the stability of labor relations sought
by the policy favoring arbitration cannot be achieved. 58 Furthermore,
the broad reading of the exception is so devoid of standards that it per-
mits judges to substitute their views for those of arbitrators in direct con-
travention of the Trilogy, and encourages parties to engage in lengthy
52. Cf. Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 668, 672-73.
53. The doctrine of refusal to enforce contracts violative of law or public policy "derives from
the basic notion that no court will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral
or illegal act, and is further justified by the observation that the public's interest in confining the
scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes
account of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such agreements." United
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
54. Id. But see Judge Easterbrook's concurrence in E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Gras-
selli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 618 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring) ("A power to set aside awards on grounds of public policy, as distinct from
rules of law, is too sweeping. A court lacks this power for the same reason the arbitrator does-the
function of arbitrator and court is to carry out a contract, and contracts bind unless made unlawful
by rules of positive law.")
55. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834
F.2d 1424, 1427 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) (court vacated award reinstating employee who had circum-
vented safety procedures at a nuclear power plant, holding that it need not find that the award was
unlawful to vacate on public policy grounds).
56. Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 856 F.2d 1174, 1181 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 257 (1989), quoting Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204,
Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424, 1427 (8th Cir. 1987). See Gould, Judicial Review of Labor
Arbitration Awards, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464, 491-95 (1989). Professor Gould argues that
arbitrators could reduce the incidence of judicial reversal of arbitration awards in discharge cases on
public policy grounds in two ways. First, arbitrators should make specific findings with respect to
the possibility for rehabilitation of the employee to support awards of reinstatement, and second,
arbitrators should demonstrate flexibility in denying a reinstatement remedy when there is a public
policy risk in reinstatement. If these practices were followed, according to Professor Gould courts
would be more comfortable giving appropriate deference to the arbitrator's award. Id.
57. See Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public
Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 3, 34 (1988); Hexter, supra note
43, at 103-05.
58. Id. Hexter, supra note 43, at 103-05.
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and expensive post-award litigation.5 9 Also, a sweeping public policy ex-
ception interferes with the paramount public policy of requiring collec-
tive bargaining by employers and unions to achieve the objective of labor
peace.60 A final argument against a broad public policy exception is that
the court, like the arbitrator, is bound to enforce the contract unless it
violates positive law. 6' These two contrasting views of the public policy
exception have been reflected in the private sector public policy cases
decided by the lower federal courts since W R. Grace and Misco. 62
III. ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In contrast to the private sector, where the Trilogy principles are
uniformly accepted if not always strictly followed, judicial involvement
in public sector arbitration varies widely. Initially courts held that all
agreements by government employers to arbitrate constituted unlawful
delegations of governmental authority.6 3 Despite increasing judicial rec-
ognition of the authority of public employers to agree to arbitrate certain
disputes, this theory of nondelegability remains viable with respect to
certain issues.64 Moreover, courts historically have been less deferential
59. Edwards, supra note 57, at 23 and 34; Hexter, supra note 43, at 103-05.
60. Edwards, supra note 57, at 23-29. Judge Edwards notes that a court invalidating an arbitra-
tion award on public policy grounds usurps the function of the National Labor Relations Board,
which is to determine which subjects of bargaining are mandatory under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. Id. at 28.
61. See E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611,
618 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("A power to set
aside awards on ground of public policy, as distinct from rules of law is too sweeping. A court lacks
this power for the same reason the arbitrator does---the function of arbitrator and court is to carry
out a contract, and contracts bind unless made unlawful by rules of positive law.").
62. While there was an occasional challenge to an arbitration award based on public policy
prior to the Supreme Court's recent decisions in W. R. Grace and Misco, see, e.g., Local 453, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963),
those two cases, in spite of what appears to be narrow language regarding the public policy excep-
tion, have spawned a number of private sector cases alleging that arbitrators' decisions violate public
policy. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 2, at 44. Feuille & LeRoy note, however, that despite the
increase in the number of public policy challenges in the 1980s, they remain a small percentage of all
appeals. Id. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinist Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th
Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2205 (1989) (court applied narrow public policy exception), Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 871
(1989) (court applied broad public policy exception); Iowa Elec. Light and Power Company v. Local
Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987) (court applied broad public
policy exception). See Craver, supra note 1, at 35-44 for a thorough discussion of the judicial appli-
cation of the public policy exception in cases under the National Labor Relations Act. Craver ar-
gues persuasively that courts should not invalidate arbitration awards unless "the action ordered by
the arbitrator would be wholly improper if directed by the negotiating parties themselves." Id. at 43.
63. Craver, supra note 10, at 333.
64. Id. at 338-341; Comment, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1611, 1719-21 (1984); Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-66 to 60-67 (1983). See,
e.g., Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd., 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 366
So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1978) (elected school board has the exclusive prerogative to decide whether or not to
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to arbitration of grievances in the public sector, demonstrating both a
reluctance to order arbitration in the absence of a clear agreement to
arbitrate the dispute at issue, and a willingness to set aside awards with
which they disagree.65
In recent years, many states have adopted the Trilogy principles, or
standards analogous to the Trilogy, for arbitrability and enforcement de-
terminations in the public sector.66 Despite adoption of the Trilogy stan-
dards in theory, however, the deference suggested by these standards is
often ignored in practice.67
A. Arbitrability Determinations in the Public Sector
The issue of arbitrability may arise at any point during the arbitra-
tion process. The courts68 may be faced with determining arbitrability
reappoint nontenured teacher); Berkshire Hills Regional School Dist. Comm. v. Berkshire Hills
Educ. Ass'n, 375 Mass. 522, 377 N.E.2d 940 (1978) (the appointment of a school principal is nondel-
egable, hence not a proper matter for arbitration); Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Min-
neapolis Special School Dist. No. 1, 258 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977) (decision to transfer a number of
teachers is not arbitrable as it is a managerial decision); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwau-
kee, 113 Wis.2d 192, 335 N.W.2d 417 (1983) (discharge of probationary police officer is
nondelegable).
65. See Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-62.
66. Craver, supra note 10, at 333-41.
67. This is not to suggest that courts consistently follow the deferential standards of the Trilogy
in the private sector. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d
677 (2nd Cir. 1966). Indeed, in recent years, court decisions overturning public sector arbitration
awards may be no more common than those overturning private sector awards. Compare Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 894 F.2d 998 (8th Cir.
1990) (award vacated because it did not draw its essence from the bargaining agreement); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 429 v. Toshiba America, Inc., 879 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1989)
(court recognized the limited standard of judicial review mandated by the Trilogy, but vacated the
award regardless because the arbitrator did not conform to the terms of the agreement); Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 864 F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir. 1988) quot-
ing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (arbitrator
cannot substitute "his own brand of industrial justice" for what is required by the contract) with
Board of Trustees for State Technical Colleges v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local
1942, 179 Conn. 184, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979) (judicial review of the legality of the award does not
conflict with the scope of review explained in the Trilogy); Musser v. County of Centre, 101 Pa.
Commw. 193, 515 A.2d 1027 (1986), aff'd, 519 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988) (court purported to
adhere to the Trilogy's "essence" test, but vacated the award because the arbitrator exceeded
authority).
68. Typically, in the public sector as in the private sector, see United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), the responsibility of deciding substantive arbitrability
belongs to the courts. In some states, however, the arbitrator has the initial task of deciding whether
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute, subject to review by the court in an action to set
aside or confirm the award. See, e.g., Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal.3d 442, 595 P.2d 129, 155 Cal. Rptr.
695 (1979); Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 391
A.2d 1318 (1978); State v. AFSCME Council 4, 13 Conn. App. 461, 537 A.2d 517 (1988). In some
states, it is the function of the administrative agency created by the collective bargaining law to
determine arbitrability. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Warren Township High School Dist. 121 v.
Warren Township High School Fed'n of Teachers, 128 Il. 2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989)(Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Act divested circuit courts of power to determine the arbitrability of
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before or after the arbitration.69 One party, typically the employer, may
refuse to arbitrate a grievance on the grounds that the grievance is not
arbitrable. A court will confront this issue either in an action to compel
arbitration by the union or an action to stay arbitration by the employer.
In either case, the court must determine whether the parties agreed to
grievances); Board of Educ. of Danville Community Cons. School Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ.
Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 347, 529 N.E.2d 1110 (1988), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535
N.E.2d 912 (1989) (same); Snow, The Steelworkers Trilogy in Oregon's Public Sector, 21 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 445, 455 (1985) ("[wlhen a party to a public sector collective bargaining agreement
refuses to submit a dispute to arbitration or to implement an arbitration award, the other party may
file an unfair labor practice complaint with the (Employment Relations Board in Oregon].") In
contrast to substantive arbitrability claims, procedural arbitrability claims, such as arguments that a
grievance was not timely filed under the contract, are left to the arbitrator in both the private and
public sectors, subject to review in the same manner as the disposition on the merits. See Town of
East Hartford v. East Hartford Municipal Employees Union, Inc., 206 Conn. 643, 651-54, 539 A.2d
125, 130-32 (1988); Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-24 and 60-25.
69. Post-arbitration challenges to legal arbitrability differ little from pre-arbitration challenges
to legal arbitrability. Cases involving appointment, promotion and nonrenewal of teachers are as
common among post-arbitration judicial review cases as they are among pre-arbitration arbitrability
cases. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d
878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976) (arbitration award requiring reinstatement of nontenured teacher which
would provide tenure by operation of statute void as against public policy, so court modified award
to require reinstatement for additional nontenured year); School Comm. of Peabody v. Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers, Local 294, 19 Mass. App. 449, 475 N.E.2d 410 (1985) (court set aside arbitration
award holding that employer violated contract by failing to appoint two employees to positions of
assistant high school principal because appointment nondelegable); Meehan v. Nassau Community
College, 152 A.D.2d 313, 548 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1989) (award of grievance board which found that the
employer violated the agreement by failing to assign courses to teachers solely on the basis of senior-
ity unenforceable as against public policy); Board of Educ. of Danville Community Cons. School
Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d 347, 529 N.E.2d 1110 (1988)
(arbitrator's determination that school board's refusal to assign tenured teacher to extracurricular
coaching position violated the collective bargaining agreement not void as against public policy of
nondelegability expressed in School Code), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535 N.E.2d 912 (1989).
Compare Teaneck Bd. of Educ. v. Teaneck Teachers Ass'n, 94 N.J. 9, 462 A.2d 137 (1983) (claim of
discrimination in appointment not arbitrable because appointment decisions are managerial preroga-
tives) with Blue Hills Regional Dist. School Comm. v. Flight, 383 Mass. 642, 421 N.E.2d 755 (1981)
(award of arbitrator compelling employer to appoint teacher to administrative position which she
was denied because of her sex does not implicate the nondelegability doctrine because it is no more
intrusive on managerial prerogative than the same decision by an independent commission enforcing
laws against discrimination).
In post-award challenges to arbitrability the party contesting arbitrability has a concrete award
to demonstrate the interference with governmental decisionmaking authority rather than a more
speculative assertion that arbitration will interfere with that authority. See School Comm. of South-
bridge v. Brown, 375 Mass. 502, 506, 377 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1978) (stay denied because a petition to
stay arbitration should not be allowed simply because a possible remedy might intrude on the non-
delegable authority of a school committee); Riverhead Central School Dist. v. Riverhead Central
Faculty Ass'n, 528 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613, 140 A.D.2d 526, 527 (stay denied because in deciding an
application for a stay, a court should not asume prematurely that the only remedy to be granted is an
impermissible one), appeal denied, 72 N.Y.2d 810, 534 N.Y.S.2d 938, 531 N.E.2d 658 (1988); En-
larged City School Dist. v. Troy Teachers Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d 905, 508 N.E.2d 930, 516 N.Y.S.2d 195
(1987) (lower court's decision to stay arbitration was error and reversed because there was possible
relief in the arbitration proceeding that would not violate public policy); Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Bd. v. Bald Eagle Area Educ. Ass'n, 499 Pa. 62, 67, 451 A.2d 671, 673 (1982) (stay denied




arbitrate the disputed issue.70 The issue of arbitrability also may arise
after arbitration, when the losing party contends that the award is unen-
forceable because the grievance was not arbitrable.71 The losing party
also may assert other grounds for overturning the award, either as a de-
fense to an action for enforcement of the award or in an action to vacate
the award.7 2
Determinations of arbitrability fall into two categories-contractual
arbitrability and legal arbitrability.7 3 Contractual arbitrability concerns
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue, while legal arbitrability
concerns whether the parties lawfully could agree to allow the arbitrator
70. The first two cases in the Steelworkers Trilogy, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960), were actions to compel arbitration.
71. The post-award challenge to arbitrability will be made in an action to vacate the award or
as a defense to an action to enforce the award. See City of Des Moines v. Central Iowa Pub. Em-
ployees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442 (Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1989) (city's petition to
vacate award was denied, as court held the arbitrator had authority to decide arbitrability); Bing-
hamton Civil Service Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d
482 (1978) (court denied city's challenge to the arbitrability as a defense in the union's confirmation
action since the city had agreed to submit the question to the arbitrator in the first place). Under
some circumstances, a party challenging arbitrability after issuance of an award may be held to have
waived the right to contest arbitrability. See Borough of Naugatuck v. AFSCME Council 4, 190
Conn. 323, 460 A.2d 1285 (1983) (borough should have sought the aid of the court in determining
arbitrability before submitting the question to arbitration; since it did not, it could not challenge
arbitrability later); Port Huron Area School Dist. v. Port Huron Educ. Ass'n, 426 Mich. 143, 393
N.W.2d 811 (1986) (a party who voluntarily submits a grievance to arbitration may be precluded
from later challenging the arbitrability of that grievance, although the same party does not waive the
right to challenge the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority); Binghamton
Civil Service Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978)
(once the city actively participated in the arbitration process, it waived any objection it may have
had as to the issue's arbitrability); City of New Haven v. AFSCME Council 15, 208 Conn. 411, 544
A.2d 186 (1988) (where city submitted arbitrability issue to the arbitrators, it is as bound by the
arbitrators' decision on that issue as it is on any other issue). Other states, however, encourage the
parties to arbitrate the dispute and litigate arbitrability afterwards, if necessary. See Board of Educ.
of Community Unit School Dist. No. 4 v. Champaign Educ. Ass'n, 15 Ill. App. 3d 335, 342, 304
N.E.2d 138, 143 (1973) (a timely objection to arbitrability preserves the right to challenge the award
after participating in the arbitration process); Board of Trustees v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations
Bd., 173 Ill. App. 3d 395, 413, 527 N.E.2d 538, 550 (1988) (consideration of nondelegability argu-
ment best postponed until after arbitration); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Bald Eagle Area
School Dist., 499 Pa. 62, 451 A.2d 671 (1982) (objections to arbitrability should be presented to the
arbitrator first, subject to appropriate court review of the award). As noted by Craver, supra note
10, at 345, the latter is the better rule, for it eliminates potentially unnecessary court challenges. See
Firefighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 614, 526 P.2d 971, 975, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 507, 511 (1974). The disadvantage of such a rule, however, is that by proceeding to arbitration
and challenging the award only if the decision is unfavorable, employers may foster unrest among
the employees who perceive that the employer is undermining the grievance procedure. Some courts
also have held that failure to petition the court to set aside an award as inarbitrable within the
statutory time frame waives the right to raise the issue in defense of an action for enforcement. See
Burt v. Duval County School Bd., 481 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). This rule may serve
to eliminate frivolous arbitrability arguments.
72. See infra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.




to decide the issue at hand. Legal arbitrability issues are rare in the pri-
vate sector but relatively common in the public sector, primarily because
of the nondelegability issue.74 Pre-arbitration issues of legal arbitrability
implicate many of the same public policy questions faced by the courts in
reviewing awards for consistency with law and public policy.75 A review
of several cases dealing with each type of arbitrability issue will demon-
strate the various standards used by public sector courts deciding arbi-
trability questions.
1. Contractual Arbitrability
In deciding issues of contractual arbitrability, many public sector
courts have adopted the private sector presumption of arbitrability set
forth in the Steelworkers Trilogy.76 For example, in Kaleva-Norman-
Dickson School District v. Kaleva-Norman Dickson School Teachers'
Ass'n, 77 the Michigan Supreme Court held arbitrable a teacher's claim
that the school board's refusal to renew her contract was a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement, stating "[t]he policy favoring arbitration
of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements, as enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers' Trilogy, is ap-
propriate for contracts entered into under the PERA.1 78 Despite the fact
that the agreement contained a strong management rights clause, the
court looked solely at the arbitration clause and found no evidence of
exclusion of nonrenewal claims from arbitration. The issue of whether
nonrenewal was a right reserved to management was an issue of the mer-
its, according to the court, and the decision on the merits was committed
to the arbitrator not the courts. In reversing the lower courts, which had
enjoined arbitration based on their interpretation of the management
rights clause, the Michigan Supreme Court heeded the admonition of the
United States Supreme Court that a court "should view with suspicion
an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the
substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door
of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the
services of an arbitrator. '79
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 125-61 and accompanying text, for discussion of review of awards on public
policy grounds.
76. Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-22 to 60-23.
77. 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975).
78. 393 Mich. at 590-92, 227 N.W.2d at 503-04 (citations omitted). The PERA is the Michigan
Public Employment Relations Act. Id. at 590, 227 N.E.2d at 503.
79. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960). The
decision in Kaleva-Norman-Dickson was based solely on contractual arbitrability. The court did not
deal with the question of legal arbitrability which frequently is raised in cases involving nonrenewal
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Although many courts purport to have accepted the Trilogy princi-
ples for resolving arbitrability disputes in the public sector, in actual
practice some courts have demonstrated less willingness to refrain from
involvement in the merits than the Michigan Supreme Court showed in
Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School District. In Policemen's & Firemen's Re-
tirement Board v. Sullivan,80 the Connecticut Supreme Court quoted
with approval Warrior & Gulf's counsel that any "[d]oubts [concerning
arbitrability] should be resolved in favor of coverage." 8' Nevertheless,
the court held that a grievance regarding the disability provisions of the
pension plan was not arbitrable. The court reached this conclusion de-
spite the fact that the arbitration clause applied to the interpretation and
application of the articles of the agreement and Article 15 of the agree-
ment expressly stated that the two police pension plans would continue
to be the pension plans for specified groups of employees. According to
the court, because the pension plans were created by the legislature and
were neither set forth verbatim in the agreement nor expressly incorpo-
rated in the agreement, the parties could not have intended to arbitrate
disputes over pensions. In a dissenting opinion in Sullivan, Justice Loi-
selle criticized the majority for weighing the merits of the dispute in the
guise of determining arbitrability.8 2
Similarly, in Portland Association of Teachers v. Portland School Dis-
trict No. 1,83 the Oregon Appellate Court affirmed a decision by the Ore-
gon Employment Relations Board ("ERB") denying an order to
arbitrate. The ERB found that the collective bargaining agreement
unambiguously provided that the use of a certain procedure for teacher
evaluation was permissive, not mandatory as contended by the union in
its grievance, and therefore arbitration was not required.8 4 In making
this determination, both the ERB and the court engaged in contractual
interpretation of the dispute's merits, violating the principles of Warrior
& Gulf while purporting to rely on that decision. 5
While the Sullivan and Portland courts paid lip service to the Tril-
of probationary teachers. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Cf. Brown v. Holton Pub.
Schools, 401 Mich. 398, 258 N.W.2d 51 (1977) where the court was faced with a legal arbitrability
challenge to a grievance over nonrenewal of a probationary teacher, but found it unnecessary to rule
on the issue because the grievance was not based on any specific contract language, rendering it
contractually inarbitrable.
80. 173 Conn. 1, 376 A.2d 399 (1977).
81. Id. at 7, 376 A.2d at 403, quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583.
82. Id. at 14, 376 A.2d at 406.
83. 51 Or. App. 321, 625 P.2d 1336 (1981).
84. Id. at 324-26, 625 P.2d at 1338-39.
85. See Snow, supra note 68, at 464-69 for a criticism of the case and others in which the courts
and the ERB become involved in the merits of the dispute in determining arbitrability.
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ogy, other courts have explicitly found the Trilogy presumption of arbi-
trability inappropriate. In Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool
Central School District v. United Liverpool Faculty Association, 6 the New
York Court of Appeals found the policy favoring arbitration in the pri-
vate sector inapplicable to the public sector because of the lack of both
widespread acceptance and demonstrated efficacy of arbitration. Thus,
the court inferred that the parties intended the arbitration clause to have
a narrow scope "in the absence of clear, unequivocal agreement to the
contrary. 87 Despite purporting to apply the Liverpool rule, however,
New York courts, including the Court of Appeals, frequently have or-
dered arbitration and affirmed arbitration awards challenged on the basis
of lack of arbitrability. 88 Like the Trilogy principles, the Liverpool rule
often has been honored in the breach.
2. Legal Arbitrability
Legal arbitrability claims, unlike contractual arbitrability claims,
are relatively unique to the public sector.89 The legal arbitrability argu-
ment is based on the theory that the parties could not lawfully agree to
arbitrate the contested issue, and therefore, the court cannot order arbi-
tration or, if arbitration has occurred, cannot enforce the award.90 Most
legal arbitrability claims are based on the nondelegability theory, i.e.,
that the government cannot delegate its powers to an outside authority. 91
While the theory has passed its zenith, it still operates to preclude arbi-
tration of certain subjects, either because the legislature has expressly
excluded those subjects from arbitration 92 or because the court interprets
86. 42 N.Y.2d 509, 369 N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1977).
87. Id. at 514, 369 N.E.2d at 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 190. See also Service Employees Int'l
Union, Local 614 v. County of Napa, 99 Cal. App. 3d 946, 160 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1979) where the
California Appellate Court held that the employer was not required to arbitrate a dispute over denial
of merit increases, citing its "doubt" that the Steelworkers Trilogy principles applied to public sector
agreements while holding that even if the principles applied, arbitration must be denied.
88. Craver, supra note 10, at 337-38 and cases cited therein.
89. See Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-6 to 60-8.
90. Id. at 60-6 to 60-8, 60-10 to 60-11.
91. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d
878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976) (board of education cannot give up the authority to make tenure deter-
minations); Paterson Police PBA, Local No. I v. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981)
(award vacated because as a general rule, a public employer may not relinquish any of its managerial
prerogatives); State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d 233 (1978) (court
reversed PERC's decision in a scope of negotiations determination as a public employer may not
bind the discretion of the Civil Service Commission). The nondelegability argument may contest the
authority of the public employer to delegate decisionmaking authority to an arbitrator or the author-
ity of the employer to limit its discretionary power by the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Perkovich & Stein, Challenges to Arbitration under Illinois Public Sector Labor Relations
Statutes, 7 HoFSrRA LAB. L.J. 191, 198 (1989).
92. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (1990) (collective bargaining agreement can-
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the legislative enactments to restrict delegation.93
In the latter category, disputes involving tenure for teachers are fre-
quently the subject of nondelegability arguments. The New York Court
of Appeals in Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Association 94
held that the Board of Education could not relinquish the responsibility
to make tenure decisions.95 Therefore, the court refused to enforce an
arbitration award that reinstated a probationary teacher discharged with-
out just cause, a remedy which would confer tenure on the teacher by
operation of the statute.96 Nevertheless, the court found that the school
board could negotiate supplemental procedural steps to be followed prior
to a tenure decision and the arbitrator could order reinstatement without
tenure for an additional year as a remedy for failure to follow such
procedures.
Legal arbitrability issues are intertwined inextricably with issues of
negotiability. Many of the decisions on arbitrability in the public sector
turn on the question of whether the subject of the arbitration is negotia-
ble.97 Some courts have held, however, that once the employer has nego-
tiated about a subject, it must arbitrate issues relating to that subject,
regardless of whether it had the authority to negotiate about the subject
not provide for binding arbitration of disputes involving discipline of employees with statutory ten-
ure or civil service protection).
93. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 91. This interpretation may be based on limitations
regarding negotiability. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
94. Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390
N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976).
95. Accord Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280, 1285
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1978)("[i]t is the public policy of Florida as
expressed by statute that our elected school boards shall have the exclusive prerogative to decide
whether to reappoint nontenured teachers.") Cf Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich.
App. 637, 242 N.W.2d 478 (1976)(court upheld arbitrator's award reinstating probationary teacher
for violation of provisions of Teachers Tenure Act incorporated by reference in collective bargaining
agreement, although reinstatement had the effect of awarding tenure by operation of statute.) But
see Brown v. Holton Pub. Schools, 401 Mich. 398, 258 N.W.2d 51 (1977) where the court found that
there was no contractual basis on which to arbitrate a probationary teacher's grievance based on
nonrenewal, thereby avoiding the necessity of ruling on the question of legal arbitrabiity.
96. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2509 (McKinney 1981) grants the school board the sole authority to
confer tenure on those persons who have been found competent, efficient and satisfactory at the end
of the probationary period. Yet persons who have served the full probationary period and continue
to teach are entitled by statute to retain their positions absent just cause for removal, which confers
tenure without confirmation by the school board. Cohoes, 40 N.Y.2d at 779, 358 N.E.2d at 881, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 56. Thus, if the court confirmed the arbitrator's award reinstating the teacher in
Cohoes, the teacher would be tenured by virtue of continuing to teach beyond expiration of the
probationary period. Id. at 777, 358 N.E.2d at 879, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
97. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 161, 393
A.2d 278, 286 (1978). For a critical discussion of the role that scope of bargaining determinations
play in arbitrability determinations, see Toole, Judicial Activism in Public Sector Grievance Arbitra-
tion: A Study of Recent Developments, 33 ARB. J. 6 (Sept. 1978).
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in the first instance. 98 In addition, where there is a category of permis-
sive subjects for negotiation, as in the private sector,99 the fact that a
grievance does not concern a mandatory bargaining subject may not be
dispositive of the arbitrability issue. Several courts have held that once
the employer has chosen to negotiate about a permissive subject, it must
arbitrate grievances alleging violations of the provisions of the agreement
relating to permissive subjects of bargaining.too
. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards in the Public Sector
Typically, judicial review of arbitration awards is limited to grounds
specified in the state's Uniform Arbitration Act 1' and to legal challenges
98. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66,
74, 391 A.2d 1318, 1322 (1978). ("To permit an employer to enter into agreements and include
terms such as grievance arbitration which raise the expectations of those concerned, and then to
subsequently refuse to abide by those provisions on the basis of its lack of capacity would invite
discord and distrust and create an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship would virtually be
impossible to maintain.")
99. See NLRB v. Wooster Div., Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) in which the court
defines three categories of bargaining subjects under the National Labor Relations Act, mandatory,
permissive, and illegal. The parties are free to bargain about permissive subjects if they choose to do
so and, if agreement is reached, the resulting contract is enforceable. Id. at 349.
100. See, e.g., Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139,
141 (Iowa 1983) (grievance over denial of salary increase for unsatisfactory performance arbitrable
since "restrictive interpretation of mandatory bargaining topics does not inhibit voluntary bargain-
ing and agreement on permissive topics"); Susquehanna Valley Central School Dist. v. Susquehanna
Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (employer that
voluntarily bargained about staff size, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, was required to arbi-
trate a grievance over a staff reduction.) The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, in Paterson
Police PBA Local No. I v. City of Paterson, 87 N.J. 78, 432 A.2d 847 (1981), narrowed the scope of
permissive subjects in denying enforcement of arbitration awards finding violations of the promotion
clause of the collective bargaining agreement. The court stated that no issue is permissively negotia-
ble unless it leaves the government's policymaking powers "essentially unfettered." Id. at 93, 432
A.2d at 854. The court further cautioned PERC that "the category of permissive subjects we have
delineated is not broad." Id. According to the court, the narrow definition was necessary to ensure
that bargaining did not "defeat the public's right to participate in the making of governmental pol-
icy, or to bypass the predominant duty of public employers to promote the public welfare." Id. at
93, 432 A.2d at 854-55. Clearly, the court's decision was motivated by the same view of public
policy which led the court to construe narrowly the scope of bargaining under the New Jersey Em-
ployer-Employee Relations Act and to hold that there is no classification of permissive bargaining
subjects under that statute. See State v. State Supervisory Employees Ass'n, 78 N.J. 54, 393 A.2d
233 (1978) and Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d
278 (1978). The Paterson case dealt with the existence of a permissive category of subjects for police
and firefighters who are covered by distinct statutory provisions which expressly refer to permissive
subjects. See Paterson, 87 N.J. at 87, 432 A.2d at 851; Ridgefield Park, 78 N.J. at 158, 393 A.2d at
284. For a thorough discussion of Ridgefield Park and State Supervisory Employees, see Comment,
After Ridgefield Park and State Supervisory Employees: The Scope of Collective Negotiations in the
Public Sector of New Jersey, 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 558 (1980).
101. Mastriani & Anderson, supra note 20, at 60-32. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of the Findlay
City School Dist. v. Findlay Educ. Ass'n, 49 Ohio St. 3d 129, 551 N.E.2d 186 (1990) (court upheld
award of restoration rights to former teacher based on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10 (Anderson
1981) which permits a court to vacate an award only for fraud or misconduct or if the arbitrator
exceeded his or her authority); Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Amalgamated Transit
[Vol. 66:631
THE PUBLIC SECTOR
to either arbitrability, as discussed previously, or to the legality of the
award. The most commonly invoked statutory ground for review of
awards is the claim that the arbitrator exceeded the contractual limita-
tions on the authority of the arbitrator. In deciding such issues, many
courts have relied on the Trilogy standard derived from Enterprise
Wheel, 10 2 either in interpreting the Arbitration Act 0 3 or as an independ-
ent standard of review.10 4
Although most courts, in accordance with the Enterprise Wheel
standard,1° 5 purport to eschew review of arbitration awards on the mer-
its, some courts have engaged in merits review in the guise of determin-
Union, Div. 85, 492 Pa. 494, 424 A.2d 1299 (1981) (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon
1989)), patterned after the Arbitration Act of 1927, allowed an award to be vacated only for a
showing of fraud or misconduct, or if the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority, so the court
upheld the award which granted benefits to injured employees). See also Uniform Arbitration Act,
MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08-.30 (1988).
102. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). (The
award is legitimate so long as it "draws its essence" from the agreement.)
103. See, e.g., Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 492 Pa. 494,
424 A.2d 1299 (1981); Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver
County, Society of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977).
104. See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Central Iowa Pub. Employees Council, 369 N.W.2d 442
(Iowa 1985), aff'd, 439 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1989); Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City
Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa S. Ct. 1983); Ferndale Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 67 Mich.
App. 637, 242 N.W.2d 478 (1976). In states in which awards are reviewed initially by the adminis-
trative agency rather than the courts, the standards of review applied are similar to those under the
Uniform Arbitration Acts and the Trilogy. See Snow, supra note 68, at 473-80. (Oregon uses the test
first articulated in Willamina Educ. Ass'n v. Willamina School Dist. No. 30-44-63J, 4 P.E.C.B.R.
2571 (1980), remanded, 50 Or. App. 195, 623 P.2d 658 (1981), aff'd on rehearing after remand, 60
Or. App. 629, 655 P.2d 189 (1982), which "established that an award would be discarded if it was
clear 1) that the parties had not contractually agreed to accept the award as final and binding or 2)
that enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy." Snow, supra note 68, at 474.
This test resembles the Trilogy standard and has resulted in challenges based on allegations that
arbitral authority was exceeded or that public policy was violated by the award.). In Board of Educ.
of Danville Comm. Cons. School Dist. No. 118 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App.
3d 347, 353, 529 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (4th Dist. 1988), cert. denied, 124 Ill. 2d 553, 535 N.E.2d 912
(1989), the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed a decision by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board ("IELRB") finding that an employer committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to com-
ply with an arbitration award which was valid since there was "no evidence of fraud, dishonesty or
serious error" and "the arbitrator was at least arguably acting within the scope of his authority."
The IELRB has exclusive jurisdiction to review arbitration awards under the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act. Bd. of Educ. of Community School Dist. No. I v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216,
526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
105. See, e.g., AFSCME v. State, 158 Ill. App. 3d 584, 588, 511 N.E.2d 749, 751 (1987), aff'd,
124 Ill. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988) (award which reduced discipline of employee from discharge
to suspension was reinstated, as an award is not subject to review on the merits), Ferndale, 67 Mich.
App. at 643, 242 N.W.2d at 480 (Trilogy theory that the merits of an award are irrelevant in subse-
quent review was adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mich.
648, 112 N.W.2d 80 (1961)); Metropolitan Airports Comm'n v. Metropolitan Airports Police Fed'n,
443 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 1989) (arbitrator is the judge as to the facts and law, and award cannot
be vacated if it draws its essence from the contract); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 912, 391 A.2d
1173, 1176 (1978) (as long as the award draws its essence from the contract, it is within the arbitra-
tor's authority and the court's review must end).
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ing whether the arbitrator exceeded contractual authority. 106 In Board
of Education of the City of New Haven v. AFSCME Council 4,107 the
court reviewed an arbitration award that reinstated an employee because
the employer violated the contract by the manner in which it served the
notice of termination. The arbitration panel's decision relied on a stipu-
lated arbitration award in another case, which was introduced into evi-
dence. The court, while quoting Enterprise Wheel, found that the panel
exceeded its authority by relying on a document that was not a part of
the contract. In a strong dissent, Justice Parsky pointed out that the
stipulated award was the parties' interpretation of the agreement and
therefore, a legitimate basis for the arbitration award.108 Similarly, in
State of Connecticut v. AFSCME Council 4,109 the court vacated an arbi-
tration award on the basis that it was inherently inconsistent with the
agreement. Again, while purporting to apply Trilogy principles, the
court interpreted the agreement differently than the arbitrator and on
that basis, overturned the award.' 10
106. Such an approach is not unique to the public sector although it may be more common
there. Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966) is
frequently criticized as a case in which the court did precisely that. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note
28, at 1152-53. In Torrington, the arbitrator sustained the union's grievance which alleged that the
employer breached the contract by unilaterally eliminating a long-standing practice of paying em-
ployees for one hour to vote on Election Day. The court refused to enforce the award, stating that
by relying on past practice where there was no language in the collective bargaining agreement, the
arbitrator added to the agreement in violation of the common contractual reservation on the arbitra-
tor's powers which prohibits adding to, modifying or altering the agreement. As ably stated by
Professor St. Antoine, "any time a court is incensed enough with an arbitrator's reading of the
contract..., it is simplicity itself to conclude that the arbitrator must have 'added to or altered' the
collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1153.
107. 195 Conn. 266, 487 A.2d 553 (1985).
108. Id. at 274, 487 A.2d at 557. The Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling is analogous to the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Torrington. See supra note 106. Cf Ramsey
County v. AFSCME Council 91, 309 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1981) where the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota held that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in issuing an award based on past practice
despite the fact that the past practice conflicted with the contract language. The Ramsey court
applied the "essence" test, recognizing that the contract is not the sole evidence of the parties intent.
In contrast to the Connecticut Supreme Court in New Haven, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated
that "the concept ofjudicial deference to arbitral authority must encompass the recognition that the
arbitrator is the reader of the contract. As the parties' chosen 'reader', he is authorized to consider
matters outside the written agreement in resolving disputes arising out of the continuing employ-
ment relationship." Id. at 793. The dissent in Ramsey strongly argued that the arbitrator exceeded
his authority by using past practice to modify the unambiguous provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 795 (Peterson, J., dissenting).
109. 13 Conn. App. 461, 537 A.2d 517 (1988).
110, The arbitrator in this case decided an issue of arbitrability, which may have contributed to
the court's more intrusive review. Nevertheless, the court cited Enterprise Wheel and purported to
apply the Enterprise standard. Id. at 467, 537 A.2d at 520. The court further justified its decision by
asserting that the award conflicted with public policy because it allowed a probationary employee to
grieve her dismissal by finding that she had completed the working test period because her time as a
provisional employee was part of the working test period. According to the court such a conclusion
was contrary to civil service law which limited appointment to employees determined by examina-
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Connecticut courts are not the only courts that engage in merits
review of the public sector arbitrator's determination. The New Jersey
courts explicitly apply a different standard of contract review in the pub-
lic sector, i.e., "whether the interpretation of the contractual language is
reasonably debatable." '' In State of New Jersey v. State Troopers Frater-
nal Association," 2 the collective bargaining agreement provided for the
employees to participate in a prescription drug program which required a
co-payment of $1.25 for each prescription. During the term of the agree-
ment the legislature appropriated funds for the prescription drug pro-
gram based on a co-payment of $2.50, which prompted the employer to
change the co-payment for the employees covered by the contract." 13
Based on language in the agreement stating that the employer "shall pro-
vide" the funds necessary to maintain the program, the arbitrator found
that the change in the co-payment violated the agreement. The court
ruled that a separate section of the contract, which stated that all terms
of the agreement were subject to legislative changes, controlled all con-
tract clauses, and held that the arbitrator's interpretation was not reason-
ably debatable. The opinion suggests that the court's beliefs that co-
payment plans are reflective of an important governmental policy of cost
sharing and that benefits for all employees should be uniform for ease of
administration, significantly influenced its decision." 14 Like the Connect-
icut courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court, ignoring the Trilogy princi-
ples, found a rationale to justify overturning an arbitration award with
which it disagreed."t 5 Notably, while the attack on the award in State
tion and working test period to be fit and competent. Id. See infra notes 125-61 and accompanying
text, for further discussion of the public policy exception.
111. See State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 91 N.J. 464, 468-69, 453 A.2d 176, 178-79
(1982).
112. 91 N.J. 464, 453 A.2d 176 (1982).
113. Id. at 466, 453 A.2d at 177.
114. Id. at 470, 453 A.2d at 180.
115. See also Musser v. County of Centre, 101 Pa. Commw. 193, 515 A.2d 1027 (1986), aff'd,
513 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988) where the court reversed the arbitrator's determination that there
was no just cause to discharge two prison guards who abused a prisoner because the type of abuse in
which they engaged had long been tolerated by prison officials without discipline. Despite the fact
that arbitrators commonly rely on such condonation to reverse discharge actions, see F. ELKOURI &
E. A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 683-84 (4th ed. 1985), the court, which was justifiably
outraged by the grievants' conduct, found that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from
the agreement because he found just cause for discipline, but not discharge, and reduced the penalty
to a suspension. Had the court followed the Trilogy as it purported to do, it would not have over-
turned the award. While the court suggested that the arbitrator imposed "his own brand of indus-
trial justice" contrary to the limitation of Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596, in fact, the court
substituted its brand of industrial justice for the arbitrator's award. See Jones, 'His Own Brand of
Industrial Justice: The Stalking Horse of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
881 (1983) where the author, a distinguished arbitrator, suggests that the parties to a contract bar-
gain for arbitrator's brand of industrial justice, and thus, application of industrial justice by the
arbitrtor is not grounds for setting aside awards.
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Troopers was not based expressly on public policy, the court appeared to
be influenced by perceived public policy considerations in overturning
the award.
Public sector courts, like courts in the private sector, 1 6 occasionally
set aside awards based on the common contractual restriction that arbi-
trators cannot add to, subtract from, or modify the contract. 1 7 Employ-
ers have used this limitation to overturn awards reinstating discharged
employees. For example, in Board of Control of Ferris State College v.
Michigan AFSCME, Council 25,118 the arbitrator relied on the grievant's
remorse for hitting his supervisor and his promise not to repeat the viola-
tion to reduce the discharge to a suspension. The court found that the
arbitrator improperly modified the agreement because he found just
cause for discharge, but reinstated the employee. Similarly, the arbitra-
tor in County College of Morris Staff Association v. County College of
Morris119 stated that just cause for dismissal existed, but because the em-
ployer failed to use progressive discipline, which was a prerequisite to
discharge, the employer was required to reinstate the employee. Despite
the fact that arbitrators frequently interpret just cause to require progres-
sive discipline, the court found that the arbitrator added to the contract
by requiring progressive discipline.' 20
116. See supra note 106; Morgan Services, Inc. v. Local 323, Chicago & Cent. States Joint Bd.,
724 F.2d 1217, 1222 and n.8 (6th Cir. 1984). The court in Morgan vacated the arbitrator's award
reinstating an employee, finding that the arbitrator modified unambiguous language in the agreement
when he reduced a discharge to a suspension. In the court's view, the agreement clearly gave the
employer the right to determine the appropriate sanction for insubordination.
117. Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANN. MEET-
ING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 331, 364 (1981).
118. 138 Mich. App. 170, 361 N.W.2d 342 (1984).
119. 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985).
120. See ELKOURI AND ELKOURI, supra note 115, at 653-54. See also City of Hartford v. Local
760, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 6 Conn. App. 11, 502 A.2d 429 (1986) (The Connecticut Appellate
Court reversed an arbitration board award where the board found that the grievant was suspended
for just cause, but reduced the period of suspension. The court held that the board exceeded the
scope of the submission to arbitration by addressing the question of the remedy after finding just
cause); State v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local No. 79, 544 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1988) (The
arbitrator exceeded authority by reducing termination to suspension. Where the agreement allowed
the employer to discharge for just cause and the arbitrator found that just cause for discipline ex-
isted, the arbitrator could not reduce the penalty to a suspension.). Contra Drivers Union Local 695
v. County of Sauk, 103 Wis. 2d 691, 310 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (arbitrator's award which
found good cause for discipline but overturned the discharge of an employee where progressive
discipline and a predischarge interview were not provided, was upheld against a challenge that arbi-
trator exceeded authority and violated public policy).
Employees have asserted the same semantic argument in reverse. See McDonald v. Hardee
County School Bd., 448 So. 2d 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1984).
The arbitrator sustained a teacher's grievance because the employer did not comply with predis-
charge procedures, and reduced the discharge to a suspension. The court rejected the employee's
argument that it must vacate the award as to suspension and reinstate the employee with full back




The courts in these cases interpreted the arbitration awards as hold-
ing that just cause for discharge existed, but nevertheless reducing the
penalty imposed by the employer. Consequently, the courts vacated the
awards on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded contractual author-
ity. Each of the awards is also susceptible to an interpretation which
would warrant upholding the award, however, since each could be read
to hold that while the actions of the employee normally would provide
just cause for discharge, in the circumstances of the case, just cause did
not exist.' 21 Thus, at most there is an ambiguity in the language of the
arbitration awards that might suggest that the arbitrator exceeded con-
tractual authority. Had the courts followed the dictates of Enterprise
Wheel,122 they would have enforced rather than vacated the awards. In
Enterprise Wheel, the Court emphasized the importance of relying on the
arbitrator's informed judgment in the formulation of remedies because of
the need for flexibility.' 23 The Court further cautioned that ambiguity in
the opinion that would allow an inference that the arbitrator may have
exceeded contractual authority does not justify a refusal to enforce the
award. ' 24 Accordingly, in light of the policy favoring arbitration, courts
121. As ably stated by the dissenting justice in County College of Morris:
The majority is obviously convinced that this employee should have been fired. What
the majority has forgotten is that when the employer and the employees' association agreed
upon arbitration of the wrongful discharge issue, it was the arbitrator's conclusion that
became important and the court's conviction irrelevant.
The majority finds that the arbitrator decided that there was "just cause" for dis-
charge and that the issue, therefore, is whether the arbitrator, having found "just cause"
has the power, despite that finding, to deprive the employer of its consequent clear right to
discharge the employee. One would think the Court would hesitate to attribute to a pre-
sumably experienced, intelligent, and impartial arbitrator such a ludicrous decision,
namely, that even though he found the employer had "just cause" to discharge plaintiff,
and even though the contract explicitly allowed discharge under such circumstances, the
employer nevertheless could not discharge this employee.
That is not, however, what the arbitrator found. A fair, common sense, reading of his
opinion is that he found that ordinarily ("normally") this employee's conduct would con-
stitute "just cause" for discharge, but given the particular circumstances surrounding that
conduct, including the employer's accompanying acts, "just cause" did not exist.
County College of Morris, 495 A.2d at 873-74. (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
After discussing the court's interpretation of the award, Chief Justice Wilentz went on to say:
This interpretation by the Court drains the arbitrator's opinion of its true meaning and,
having thus drained it, the Court can go on to conclude that the arbitrator's award does
not "draw its essence from the parties' agreement."
Id. at 874.
122. Notably, several of these courts purported to rely on the Trilogy. See Board of Control, 138
Mich. App. at 173-74, 361 N.W.2d at 343-44; National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. State of Rhode
Island, 544 A.2d at 119.
123. The Supreme Court recently reemphasized the importance of arbitral flexibility with re-
spect to remedies in United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 41 (1987).
124. 363 U.S. at 598. As noted by the Court, arbitrators have no obligation to write opinions
and to require the absence of ambiguity for enforcement might discourage written opinions, which
would be detrimental to the arbitration process. Id. Despite this clear direction from the Supreme
Court, the court decisions in Board of Control, County College of Morris, and other cases cited at
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should decline the invitation to interpret ambiguous awards to conflict
with the authority of the arbitrator and, in accord with Enterprise Wheel,
enforce the awards so long as they are susceptible to an interpretation
which is consistent with the arbitrator's authority.
C. Public Policy Challenges to Arbitration Awards
In addition to reviewing awards based on the contract, courts fre-
quently are faced with public policy challenges to arbitration awards.
The arbitrability arguments discussed previously are a form of public
policy argument, for the theory of legal inarbitrability is analogous to the
public policy exception recognized by the Supreme Court in WR. Grace
and Misco, i.e., public policy as expressed by statutory or constitutional
law prohibits arbitration of the issue. The Misco public policy exception
is broader than the legal inarbitrability theory, however, because it allows
a court to invalidate an arbitration award which violates public policy
even where arbitration of the issue was legally permitted. As in the pri-
vate sector, 125 cases in the public sector reflect a range of views on the
scope of the public policy exception. Some courts have applied a narrow
public policy exception,' 26 some have applied a broad public policy ex-
ception, 27 and others, like the United States Supreme Court in Misco,
have avoided deciding the scope of the exception.
1. The Narrow Public Policy Exception
Public sector employers, like employers under the National Labor
Relations Act,' 28 have urged that arbitration awards reinstating dis-
note 120, supra, suggest that arbitrators should write their opinions with care for the language cho-
sen may determine the enforceability of the award. Arbitrators should avoid language that suggests
that just cause for discipline exists when the decision alters the penalty imposed by management.
125. See supra notes 4-7, 42-62 and accompanying text.
126. The narrow public policy exception invalidates only awards that violate positive law or
require the employer to violate positive law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of the narrow exception in the public sector, see infra notes 128-54 and accompanying
text.
127. The broad public policy exception invalidates awards that conflict with policies underlying
statutory or decisional law although the award itself neither violates the law nor requires the em-
ployer to violate the law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the
broad exception, see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. The Postal Service is covered by the National
Labor Relations Act although it is a public employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 1209(a) (1988); Respondent's
memorandum at 4, United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1988) (87-89). The Postal Service has argued in several
cases that arbitration awards reinstating discharged employees should be overturned based on the
public policy exception to the Trilogy. See United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers
Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st Cir. 1984) (award requiring Postal Service to reinstate employee
convicted of embezzling postal funds was vacated because the public policy concerns were not only
defined by positive law, but were also the clear dictates of common sense); American Postal Workers
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charged employees be overturned on public policy grounds. 1 29 In
AFSCME v. State of Illinois,130 two employees of a residential center for
the disabled were terminated for patient mistreatment after a patient died
while they were absent from the facility without authorization. The arbi-
trator found insufficient cause for discharge because the employees had
excellent work records and there was no relationship between their ab-
sence and the death of the patient, who was on a different wing from the
one in which the employees worked. The employer challenged the
award, arguing that it was against public policy to reinstate employees
who engaged in mistreatment of patients. While recognizing an impor-
tant public policy against mistreatment of the mentally disabled, the
court found that
[t]here is simply no public policy that mandates the discharge of all
employees found guilty of mistreatment of a service recipient when the
arbitrator expressly finds that the grievants were exemplary mental
health employees, when punishment has been imposed, and where no
nexis [sic] exists between the infraction and the patient's tragic
death. 131
While AFSCME exemplifies a relatively narrow reading of the pub-
lic policy exception, the opinion suggests that the decision may be fact
specific. The court noted that the misconduct of the employees did not
involve abuse of, or injury to, any residents, intimating that reinstate-
ment of an employee who engaged in such conduct might be set aside,
despite the absence of any legal prohibition on employing an individual
who mistreated a resident. 32
In another public policy discharge case, Binghamton Civil Service
Union v. United States Postal Service, 682 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1200 (1983) (since it is unlawful for an individual to hold a government position once that person has
participated in a strike against the government, arbitrator's award reinstating a postal worker who
participated in a strike was vacated). The Postal Service has urged adoption of a broad public policy
exception to enforcement of arbitration awards for the public sector. Brief for the United States
Postal Service at 8, United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1987) (87-89).
129. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen, Local 540 v. Great Western
Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), reh'g. denied, 717 F.2d 1399 (5th Cir. 1983) (award reinstating
truck driver who had wrecked a company rig and was cited by the police for drunk driving was
vacated as against public policy) and cases cited supra, at note 49.
130. 124 Il. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988).
131. Id. at 264, 529 N.E.2d at 541. The court reversed the lower court which had set aside the
arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
132. The court was also careful to distinguish the case factually from Board of Trustees of Com-
munity College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 Il1. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47
(1979), in which it had vacated an award on the basis that the decision rewarded illegal strikers at
the expense of nonstrikers by requiring the employer to count time worked during the strike as extra
time worked for priority in the assignment of summer employment. In that decision, the same court
had employed a broad view of public policy, vacating the award despite the absence of any legal
prohibition against providing benefits to teachers who had engaged in an unlawful strike.
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Forum v. City of Binghamton, 33 the arbitrator found insufficient cause
for termination of a city building superintendent who had admitted ac-
cepting bribes. The arbitrator converted the discharge to a six month
suspension. 34 New York law prohibited any municipal officer from ac-
cepting a gift where it could be inferred that the gift was intended to
influence the officer in the performance of official duties. As noted by the
court, however, the statute "[did] not inflexibly mandate the discharge of
an employee in violation of its proscriptions."'' 35 Accordingly, the court
found that the reinstatement did not violate public policy, stating: "[t]he
fact that we may disagree with the wisdom and advisability of the arbi-
tration award, gives us no license, as a court of law, to impose what we
may feel is a more appropriate remedy. The bargain, having been struck,
must now be honored."'136
The approach of the New York Court of Appeals mirrors the nar-
row interpretation of public policy adopted by some private sector
courts.137 If the award does not contravene an explicit statute or consti-
tutional provision, then it will be upheld under this narrow reading of the
exception. ' 38
The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on a similar public policy ar-
gument to set aside an arbitrator's award in Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Commission v. Teamsters Local No. 563.139 The arbitrator there
found that the employer did not have just cause to terminate an em-
ployee for nonresidency, despite an ordinance which required employees
to be city residents. The court found that the matter was not arbitrable
133. 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1978).
134. Id. at 28, 374 N.E.2d at 381, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
135. Id. at 31, 374 N.E.2d at 383, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
136. Id. A strong dissent by Judge Wachtler asserted that the government has a responsibility to
set a moral tone by maintaining the integrity of government and thus the arbitrator could not restrict
the employer's power to discharge an employee for violation of the public trust. Id. at 30-32, 374
N.E.2d at 383-84, 403 N.Y.S. at 485-86 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
137. See supra notes 7, 45 & 54 and accompanying text.
138. Accord De Paulo v. City of Albany, 49 N.Y.2d 994, 995-96, 406 N.E.2d 1064, 1065-66, 429
N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1980) (arbitration award reinstating with suspension a police officer found guilty
of releasing an impounded car without authority and filing a false report would not be set aside on
public policy grounds where conviction was for disorderly conduct and statute required discharge
for conviction of a felony or crime involving a violation of the oath of office).
In Ford v. Civil Service Employees Ass'n, 94 A.D.2d 262, 464 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1983), motion for
leave to appeal dismissed, 68 N.Y.2d 782, 498 N.E.2d 148, 506 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1985), however, the
court set aside an arbitrator's award reinstating an employee who induced a patient of the mental
health facility in which he worked to have sexual intercourse with him. The court relied on the
state's duty to protect the patients as expressed in various statutory provisions, as well as the crimi-
nal statutes defining sexual intercourse with a female who is incapable of consent as rape, to find that
the award violated public policy. As in the two foregoing cases, however, there was no explicit
statutory prohibition on continued employment of the grievant.
139. 75 Wis. 2d 602, 250 N.W.2d 696 (1977).
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because the contract provision was void as conflicting with the ordi-
nance. Although the majority found a direct conflict with the ordinance,
the dissent, citing the Trilogy and relying on the public policy favoring
arbitration, argued that the award did not violate public policy since the
ordinance authorized exceptions to the residency requirement and both
the ordinance and the agreement were adopted by the city council. Ac-
cordingly, the dissent argued, the arbitrator interpreted the agreement to
give effect to both by ruling that nonresidency was just cause for dis-
charge only if it related to job performance. Thus, the majority should
have upheld the award.140 The majority opinion can be read as a narrow
application of the public policy exception, 141 but the dissent points out
the importance of the court's interpretation of the statute that forms the
basis of the public policy argument. 142 If the court gives weight to the
public policy in favor of arbitration in deciding whether the arbitration
award is unlawful, it may be able to accommodate the award and the
allegedly conflicting statute.' 43
Two recent cases from the Connecticut Supreme Court further illus-
trate the narrow view of the public policy exception. In Watertown Police
140. Id. at 620-24, 250 N.W.2d at 705 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). Indeed, eleven years later,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with another challenge to an arbitration award based on the
allegedly conflicting ordinance requiring residency for city employees. See City of Madison v.
Madison Professional Police Officers Ass'n, 144 Wis. 2d 576, 425 N.W.2d 8 (1988). The arbitrator
there held that a union contract which exempted bus system employees from the residency require-
ment triggered a "me too" clause in the police officers' contract which exempted them from the
requirement also. The court refused to set aside the award, finding no manifest disregard of the law,
particularly in light of the fact that the city had agreed to the "me too" clause which expressly
contemplated exceptions to the ordinance. Id. at 594,425 N.W.2d at 14-15. In addressing WERC v.
Teamsters, the court held that it was overruled to the extent that it could be understood to set forth a
broad rule that ordinances always control over conflicting contracts. Id. at 595, 425 N.W.2d at 15.
The court also distinguished WERC Y. Teamsters on the facts. Id. at 590, 425 N.W.2d at 13.
141. The majority purports to invalidate the award on the ground that the award required the
employer to violate the law. 75 Wis. 2d at 612-13, 250 N.W.2d at 701.
142. See id. at 621, 250 N.W.2d at 705.
143. The California Supreme Court upheld an arbitration award in a discharge case against
claims that the city charter, which gave the city manager power to discipline and remove employees
subject to an appeal to the personnel board, prohibited arbitration. The court construed the city
charter to permit the city manager to agree to arbitral review of disciplinary decisions and to allow
arbitration as an alternative to civil service appeal, harmonizing the city charter with the public
policy favoring arbitration. See Taylor v. Crane, 24 Cal. 3d 442, 595 P.2d 129, 155 Cal. Rptr. 695
(1979). See also Social Services Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Training and Employment
Bd., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1458, 255 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1989) where the court reviewed an arbitration
award holding that the employer must offer a job to the grievant because it failed to give considera-
tion for promotion to current employees before hiring a nonemployee. While recognizing a strong
public policy that a government agency has the right to administer its own civil service system and
make discretionary promotion decisions, the court found that the discretion must be exercised in
accordance with the collective bargaining agreement which, consistent with the policy favoring ne-
gotiations, superseded conflicting agency rules. Accordingly, the remedy did not violate public pol-
icy. Id. at 1465, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 745-50.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Union, Local 541 v. Town of Watertown,'" the union challenged an arbi-
tration award upholding the discharge of a probationary police officer for
violating an order prohibiting him from making traffic stops. The union
argued that peace officers had a duty to protect the citizens of the com-
munity, based on a Connecticut statute stating that they "shall arrest"
without a warrant any person committing a crime within their jurisdic-
tion. 145 Therefore, the order to refrain from motor vehicle stops, which
formed the basis for the employee's discharge, violated public policy.
The court held that the statute applied to serious crimes, not to traffic
violations, and further found no statute creating a duty to stop and inves-
tigate every violator of traffic laws. Indeed, the court observed that po-
lice departments with limited resources lawfully could adopt a policy of
selective enforcement of minor traffic violations. Citing Misco, the court
found that the award did not contravene any "well-defined and domi-
nant" public policy "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public inter-
ests.' "146 A broader view of public policy, however, could support over-
turning the award, for certainly a court could find that an order to a
police officer to avoid enforcement of traffic laws violated public pol-
icy.' 47 The court's decision in Watertown is defensible on another
ground, however. Under the narrow view of public policy, the award,
rather than the conduct that leads to the grievance, must violate public
policy.' 48 The union argued that the discharge violated public policy,
which is insufficient to warrant vacating the award under the narrow
public policy exception.
Similarly, in City of New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15,149 the
court refused to vacate an arbitrator's decision that awarded back pay to
a police officer for the period between his termination for a criminal con-
viction and his reinstatement after the conviction was reversed on appeal.
The city claimed that because the officer's dismissal was based on the
statutory provision that an officer convicted of a violation "shall be dis-
144. 210 Conn. 333, 555 A.2d 406 (1989).
145. Id. at 341, 555 A.2d at 410.
146. Id. at 340, 555 A.2d at 410 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29, 43 (1987)).
147. The dissent in Watertown asserted that even under a narrow view of the public policy ex-
ception, the arbitration award should be set aside. 210 Conn. at 348-49, 555 A.2d at 413-414 (Hea-
ley, J., dissenting).
148. See Edwards, supra note 57, at 18; Fraternal Order of Police v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App.
437, 448, 333 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1983); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local 135, 909 F.2d 885,
893 (6th Cir. 1990).
149. 208 Conn. 411, 544 A.2d 186 (1988).
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honorably discharged,"1 50 an award of back pay for the period of dis-
charge violated public policy. Relying on the narrow scope of the public
policy exception, the court found that there was no direct violation of the
statute; further, the arbitrator's construction of that statute as not pre-
cluding a back pay award was reasonable. 51 "In the absence of a clear
arbitral misreading of statutory mandates or other egregious arbitral vio-
lation of public policy, the city has failed to prove that the arbitral award
should be vacated."' 5 2 Despite the narrow construction of the public
policy exception in these two cases, however, the court's language leaves
open the possibility of vacating an award based on public policy where
the award is not unlawful.
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division considered a
public policy challenge to an arbitration award based on asserted inter-
ference with the legislative and executive powers of the employer in
County of Rockland Department of Social Services v. Rockland County
Unit, Local 844. 153 The union argued that the contract provision obligat-
ing the county to maintain a working environment that served the "com-
fort, well-being and safety" of its employees required the employer to
insure that sufficient personnel and county vehicles were available to
transport clients. The arbitrator upheld the grievance and the county
asked the court to vacate the award. Quoting the New York Court of
Appeals, the court declined, stating, " 'arguably every controversy has at
its core some issue requiring the application, or weighing, of policy con-
siderations' but the court will intervene for reasons of public policy only
where a policy 'prohibit[s], in an absolute sense, particular matters being
decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator.' "9154
2. The Broad Public Policy Exception
The broader view of public policy has been applied by several
courts. In Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v.
Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600,155 the Illinois Supreme
150. 208 Conn. at 413, 544 A.2d at 188 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 29 (1967)).
151. Id. at 417-19, 544 A.2d at 190-91. As in the Watertown case, the court, using a broader
view of public policy could have held that where the statute directed discharge, it would violate
public policy to pay the employee for the period of termination. Underlying the court's decision in
this case may be a feeling that the city should have awaited the outcome of the appeal before making
the discharge decision.
152. 208 Conn. at 419, 544 A.2d at 191.
153. 140 A.D.2d 441, 528 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1988).
154. Id. at 443, 528 N.Y.S. 2d at 144 quoting In re Sprinzen, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 630, 631, 389
N.E.2d 456, 459, 460, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977, 978 (1979). Under the broader public policy view, the
court could have found that the award interfered with the county's budgetary and taxing authority.
155. 74 Ill. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47, 24 Il. Dec. 843 (1979).
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Court set aside an arbitration award as contrary to public policy where
the impact of the award was to give priority in assignment of extra paid
assignments to teachers who had participated in an illegal strike.
Although the award drew its essence from the agreement and violated no
statutory or constitutional provision, the court found it repugnant to
public policy because it allowed the teachers to benefit from their unlaw-
ful strike.15 6 In Board of Education, Great Neck Union Free School Dis-
trict v. Areman,15 7 the New York Court of Appeals, citing public policy
concerns, stayed arbitration of a grievance regarding a contractual provi-
sion that denied members of the Board of Education access to teacher
personnel files. The court found that the duty to employ qualified teach-
ers and to make tenure decisions required the board to have access to
personnel files and therefore, the board could not bargain away that
right. Again there was no express statutory bar to such a provision and
the board had not unlawfully delegated a duty exclusively committed to
it by law. Nevertheless, the court relied on the statutory duty to employ
and retain only qualified teachers to restrict the board's authority to ne-
gotiate contract provisions that the court believed affected the board's
ability to perform that duty. Under a narrow view of public policy, both
of these cases would have been decided differently.
3. Avoiding the Issue of the Scope of the Exception
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in City of Hartford v.
Connecticut State Board of Mediation and Arbitration,158 provides an ex-
ample of a case where the court decided the public policy issue, but
avoided determining the scope of the exception. There, the arbitration
board found that the city violated the agreement by denying the grievants
the opportunity to take an examination for promotion. As a remedy, the
arbitrators ordered the city to administer the exam to both grievants, and
to promote the more qualified of the two. The city argued that the rem-
edy violated the "rule of three"159 which was a component of the merit
selection process allowing the department head to choose any of the
three most qualified candidates for promotion. Citing United
Paperworkers v. Misco, the court found that the city did not show "the
required nexus between the failure of the arbitrators to abide by the rule
of three and a violation of the claimed public policy of merit selec-
156. Id. at 425-26, 386 N.E.2d at 53, 24 Ill. Dec. at 849.
157. 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977).
158. 211 Conn. 7, 557 A.2d 1236 (1989).
159. See R. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 185 (1984).
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tion. ' "6 Indeed, the court felt that the policy of merit selection would be
furthered by the arbitration award since inclusion of a third candidate
would risk selection of that candidate on a basis unrelated to qualifica-
tions. Like Misco, the City of Hartford case gives no clear indication of
the limits of public policy, but suggests that the court will scrutinize pub-
lic policy arguments carefully to insure that the award directly violates
public policy. 1 61
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The review of various judicial decisions in arbitration cases in the
public sector illustrates that some courts apply the deferential standards
from the private sector while others do not, even where purporting to do
so. The question that must be addressed is whether differences between
the private and public sectors require greater judicial involvement in ar-
bitration in the latter. Further, with respect to the public policy excep-
tion to arbitral deference, the issue is which of the two private sector
standards is most appropriate for judicial review in the public sector.
There are four primary arguments for a less deferential judicial ap-
proach to arbitration in the public sector. First, it is asserted that the
limited history of arbitration in the public sector precludes an inference
that the parties intended a broad arbitration clause. 162 Proponents of
this argument assert that because arbitration has not been widely used in
the public sector, it has neither the acceptability nor the demonstrated
efficacy "as a means for resolving controversies in government employ-
ment."1 63 Second, it is argued that arbitration in the public sector must
be narrowly circumscribed by the courts to protect the public interest.164
Supporters of this argument note that public sector employers are re-
sponsible to voters, not stockholders.1 65 Union demands in negotiations
are not limited by market forces to the same degree as in the private
sector.166 Thus, the argument goes, decisionmaking authority must be
exercised by those accountable to the public, which requires limiting col-
160. 211 Conn. at 17, 557 A.2d at 1240.
161. 211 Conn. at 17-18, 557 A.2d at 1241.
162. Acting Superintendent of Schools of Liverpool Central School Dist. v. United Liverpool
Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 513-14, 369 N.E.2d 746, 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (1977).
163. Id. at 513, 369 N.E.2d at 749, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
164. See Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139, 146-53
(Iowa 1983) (Reynoldson, C.J. dissenting) and sources cited therein; Kearny PBA Local #21 v.
Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 217, 405 A.2d 393, 397-98 (1979).
165. Iowa City, 343 N.W.2d at 146.
166. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 485, 225 N.W.2d 658,
666-67 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (quoting Cox & BOK, LABOR LAw 970-71 (7th ed. 1969)).
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lective bargaining and arbitration to protect the political process.1 67 In
essence, this is the nondelegability argument, extended beyond limiting
negotiations. Even if the subject in general is negotiable, the employer is
precluded from agreeing to limit its discretion in certain areas by giving
up its authority to make final decisions to an arbitrator.
The third argument is closely related to the second. It contends that
the standard of review of arbitration awards in the public sector should
be broader than in the private sector because of the statutory responsibili-
ties imposed on public employers to provide public services.1 6  Accord-
ing to this theory, any decision that would interfere with the ability of the
public employer to perform its statutory functions would violate public
policy. 169
The fourth argument for a more extensive review of arbitration
awards in the public sector is the prevalence of employment-related law
which governs employers and employees in the public sector. 17 0 Because
of the pervasive statutory regulation of the employment relationship, is-
sues presented for arbitration frequently are intertwined with statutory
issues. 17 Advocates of a stringent standard of review assert that because
of this interrelationship between statutory and contractual issues, the
167. Charles City Community School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 275 N.W.2d
766, 770-71 (Iowa 1979); DePaulo v. City of Albany, 49 N.Y.2d 994, 996-97, 406 N.E.2d 1064, 1066,
429 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (1980) (Wachtler, J., concurring) ("In view of the singular responsibility and
trust necessarily reposed in our police it would seem essential that the determination as to whether
an officer should remain on the force, at least in cases where the conduct in question concerns a
violation of the officer's oath, should be made only by those persons entrusted by the public with that
responsibility. Only those persons may be assumed to have in mind the public interest of the com-
munity, and only they are directly answerable to that community.")
168. Brief for the United States Postal Service on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, United
States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 680 (1987). See also United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 107 S. Ct. 2094 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., On Application for Stay of the Mandate of the Court
of Appeals); Niagara Wheatfield Administrators Ass'n v. Niagara Wheatfield Central School Dist.,
44 N.Y.2d 68, 73, 375 N.E.2d 37, 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1978) ("The restraints imposed by public
policy on the scope of the public employment collective bargaining process stem from the need 'to
protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted operation and functions of
government.' (Civil Service Law, § 200.) A public employer may not, through a collective bargain-
ing agreement, jeopardize its effectiveness by relinquishing control of essential facets of its
operation.")
169. See cases cited at note 168 supra.
170. See Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 922-23, 391 A.2d 1173, 1181 (1978) (Weisberger, J.,
dissenting) ("If this court should choose to abdicate from any meaningful function in the review of
such determinations, the practical enforcement of a large body of public law would be left to the
untrammeled and unreviewable discretion of arbitrators. I think that the interest of the people of this
state in the enforcement and application of laws relating to education and the rights and responsibili-
ties of those who carry out the educational function is far too compelling in nature to warrant such
abstention on our part. Even the most rudimentary demands of consistency and consonance would
be set at nought by such a system, since arbitrators have no obligation even to provide reasons for
their determinations.")
17 1. See, e.g., Faculty Ass'n of Dist. 205 v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 175 Ill. App. 3d
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courts must monitor arbitration closely to insure that arbitrators are not
usurping the court's role as interpreter of legislative enactments.1 72 A
review of each of these arguments demonstrates that none adequately
supports a more stringent standard of review for arbitration awards in
the public sector than the review applied in the private sector.
A. The Acceptability and Efficacy of Arbitration in the Public Sector
The argument that the presumption of arbitrability should not apply
in the public sector because of the lack of acceptability and efficacy of
arbitration is least persuasive and therefore, will be disposed of ini-
tially.1 73 Arbitration provides the same advantages in the public sector
as it offers in the private sector. Arbitration is a fast, inexpensive method
of resolving disputes as to the meaning and interpretation of the con-
tract. 174 Additionally, it reduces the workload of the courts.17 5
In states where arbitration is statutorily mandated, the public policy
favoring arbitration may be even stronger than the federal labor policy
underlying the Trilogy.' 76 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
880, 530 N.E.2d 548, 1251 Ill. Dec. 390 (1988); Board of Trustees for State Technical Colleges v.
Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 1942, 179 Conn. 184, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979).
172. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. An extensive debate has taken place among
professional arbitrators and academicians about the extent to which arbitrators' should decide ques-
tions of external law, particularly where there is an arguable conflict between the law and the con-
tract. See Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1967); Howlett, The Arbitra-
tor, the NLRB, and the CourtA PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2 0TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF ARBITRATOR 67 (1967); Meltzer, The Role of Law in Arbitration: Rejoinder, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 58 (1968); Howlett, The
Role of Law in Arbitration, A Reprise, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 64 (1968); Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 42 (1968); St. Antoine,
Discussion, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRA-
TORS 75 (1968); Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 29 (1970); Feller, The Coming End of
Arbitration's Golden Age, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS 97 (1976).
173. While this argument was articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Acting Superin-
tendent of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y 2d
509, 369, N.E.2d 746, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 189 (1977), a case which has not been overruled, New York
courts have not strictly applied Liverpool's presumption against arbitrability. Craver, supra note 10,
at 337. Some New York courts have applied the standard, however, so the arguments supporting
Liverpool retain some force. Id. at 337 n.44. In addition, other courts have denied arbitration on the
basis of their view as to the merits of the grievance, which may well indicate unarticulated accept-
ance of the views of the Liverpool court. See cases cited supra at notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
See also Craver, supra note 10, at 336 where he suggests that the decision in Sullivan, supra notes 80-
82 and accompanying text, may have been motivated by distrust of grievance arbitration in the
public sector.
174. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning
County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 83, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1986).
175. Id., 488 N.E.2d at 875.




[i]t is not difficult to perceive the reason for the statutory requirement
that grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the
interpretation or application of the agreement there must be a mecha-
nism for resolving the dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Histor-
ically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike and
many agreements in the private sector retain this mechanism for at
least some types of dispute. However, resolution of all disputes by re-
sort to economic force is costly to the parties, and more importantly to
the public. The General Assembly therefore chose to make the widely
used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the PERA. This
brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators to bear on the often
difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining agreement
while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guar-
anteeing both the parties and the public that such disputes will not
disrupt peaceful labor relations or interrupt public service. 177
Thus, as in the private sector, grievance arbitration in the public sector
serves as a substitute for strikes and other disruptions of harmonious la-
bor relations. 178 Arbitration of even frivolous grievances has a therapeu-
tic effect, not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector.1 79
Moreover, arbitration encourages consistent administration of manage-
ment policy by providing an impartial review of management decisions
with the power to reverse those decisions which are inconsistent with
articulated policy. 180
177. Id. at 100, 346 A.2d at 39 (footnotes omitted).
178. While strikes in the public sector are illegal in many states, they do occur. "With no sound
mechanism for resolving such disputes [about contractual rights] available, the frequent use of eco-
nomic force ... becomes a strong possibility." Baird & McArthur, Constitutional Due Process and
the Negotiation of Grievance Procedures in Public Employment, 5 J. L. EDUC. 209, 229 (1976). Even
in the absence of economic force, the employee frustration which results from the inability to resolve
disputes can destroy the harmonious relationship between employers and employees that collective
bargaining laws seek to achieve. Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 481 Pa. 66, 70, 391 A.2d 1318, 1320. Because of the absence of the right to strike in many
jurisdictions, the grievance and arbitration procedure, which enforces collectively bargained rights,
will serve to establish employee faith in the bargaining process, furthering the goal of industrial
peace. Comment, Defining the Scope of Grievance Arbitration in Public Education Employment Con-
tracts, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 814, 822 (1974); Comment, Developments in the Law-Public Employ-
ment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1721 (1984) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. ("By ensuring
protection of employees' rights under bargaining agreements, mandatory grievance arbitration
would compensate public employees for denial of the right to strike.").
179. "Even frivolous grievances are to be sent to arbitration because of arbitration's therapeutic
value in providing a safety valve for the ventilation of issues which might spill over in wildcat strikes
or job actions." Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm., 481 Pa. at 71, 391 A.2d at 1320
(citing United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960)). While public employ-
ees have other avenues of redress for certain types of complaints, Baird and McArthur, supra note
178, at 227, those avenues are not available for all disputes and may be less desirable than arbitration
because of perceptions about their viability. See Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?,
31 PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 108, 111-12 (1970); Hayford & Pegnetter, Grievance Adjudication for
Public Employees: A Comparison of Rights Arbitration and Civil Service Appeals Procedures, 35 ARB.
J. 22, 26-27 (Sept. 1980).
180. Coleman, supra note 9, at 97-98.
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The increasing use of grievance arbitration in the public sector since
Acting Superintendent of Schools v. United Liverpool Faculty Association
has established the viability of arbitration as a dispute resolution mecha-
nism.18 1 The increase in the number of states that statutorily mandate
arbitration procedures is further evidence of the recognition of the bene-
fits of arbitration in the public sector.8 2 These benefits make the pre-
sumption of contractual arbitrability as appropriate for governmental
collective bargaining agreements as it is for agreements of private
employers.
B. The Government as Employer and Arbitration Enforcement
The second and third arguments for greater scrutiny of public sector
grievance arbitration by the courts focus on the fact that the government
is the employer. Proponents of these contentions urge that the public
interest implications of arbitration in governmental employment require
both judicial review of arbitration awards on the merits and careful scru-
tiny of both pre-arbitration and post-arbitration public policy claims. If
there is no public policy violation, however, then it is difficult to under-
stand why the fact that the government is the employer justifies overturn-
ing an arbitration award based on disagreement with the decision on the
merits. The same policies that favor judicial deference to arbitration
awards in the private sector support deference in the public sector. As
declared by the Ohio Supreme Court:
[arbitration] provides the parties with a relatively speedy and inexpen-
sive method of conffict resolution and has the additional advantage of
unburdening crowded court dockets. The whole purpose of arbitration
would be undermined if courts had broad authority to vacate an arbi-
trator's award. Thus, this court has stated, "[ilt is the policy of the law
to favor and encourage arbitration and every reasonable intendment
will be indulged to give effect to such proceedings and to favor the
regularity and integrity of the arbitrator's acts."' 8 3
181. See F. ELKOURI & E. A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 17 (Supp. 1985-87) ("Leg-
islative and judicial preference for grievance arbitration has significantly increased in the public sec-
tor."); Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 178, at 1720.
182. States that mandate grievance arbitration in order to resolve labor disputes peacefully in-
clude Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1990)), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.401 (West 1981
& Supp. 1991)), Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 1608 (1989) (public employees) and ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, 1710(c) (1986) (educational employees)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 179.38 (Supp.
1991)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1989)), and Pennsylvania
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp. 1991)). The two Illinois statutes and the Ohio
statute are the most recently enacted comprehensive collective bargaining statutes, in 1983 and 1984
respectively. In addition to the states with mandatory grievance arbitration, many state statutes
authorize grievance arbitration. Comment, Developments in the Law, supra note 178, 1720 n.23. See,
e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-7 (West 1988).
183. Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. Mahoning
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As in the private sector, the collective bargaining agreement creates
a system of self-government and empowers the arbitrator to resolve dis-
putes based on the intent of the parties as reflected in the contract lan-
guage, the practices of the parties and the industry, and the effect of a
decision on morale and productivity. 8 4  It is the arbitrator, not the
court, who is the designated interpreter of the parties' intent. a5 Enforce-
ment of the arbitrator's award, within the limits set by the Trilogy stan-
dards, is enforcement of the bargain of the parties. 8 6  Thus, courts
reviewing public sector awards should avoid review on the merits in the
guise of deciding whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority.
The courts should enforce awards despite their disagreement with the
results, so long as there is no violation of public policy and the Enterprise
Wheel,187 or corresponding statutory standards, are met. 18 8 A public
employer unhappy with an arbitrator's decision can, and should resolve
the problem in subsequent contract negotiations.18 9
At first blush, the fact that the government is the employer suggests
a heightened public interest in arbitrator's decisions that might provide a
justification for an expansive review of arbitrator's awards on grounds of
public policy. A broad public policy exception to arbitral deference
would permit the court to void awards or deny arbitration on public pol-
icy grounds, regardless of whether there was any direct conflict with a
statute or constitutional provision. Thus, the court could confine arbitra-
tion consistent with its determination of the public interest.
County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 83-84, 488 N.E.2d 872, 875 (1986) (citing Campbell v.
Automatic Die & Products Co., 162 Ohio St. 321, 329, 123 N.E.2d 401, 405 (1954)).
184. See Ramsey County v. AFSCME Council 91, 309 N.W.2d 785, 790-91 (Minn. 1981) which
cites the Trilogy extensively to support its interpretation of the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act.
The Ramsey court stated that "[t]he arbitrator plays a key role in the continuing interaction between
and among the citizens of the industrial community. In resolving industrial strife, his function is to
ascertain the parties' intended standard of behavior." Id. at 791.
185. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960) ("It is the
arbitrator's construction which was bargained for.").
186. See Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 70, 391
A.2d 1318, 1320 (1978); Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907, 912, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1978).
187. 363 U.S. at 597, 599 (the courts should enforce the arbitration award so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement).
188. For cases in which the result would have been different had the court applied the limited
standard of review advocated here, see City of Hartford v. Local 760, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 6
Conn. App. 11, 502 A.2d 429 (1986); Board of Control of Ferris State College v. Michigan
AFSCME Council 25, 138 Mich. App. 170, 361 N.W.2d 342 (1984); County College of Morris Staff
Ass'n v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 495 A.2d 865 (1985); Musser v. County of Centre,
101 Pa. Commw. 193, 515 A.2d 1027 (1986), aff'd, 513 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988).
189. As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in response to an argument for a broader standard of
review for public sector collective bargaining cases "[i]f public bodies are unfairly hamstrung by
decision of arbitrators, the remedy is either meticulous contracting or statutory change in the scope




Application of a broad public policy exception, however, gives insuf-
ficient weight to the established public policy favoring arbitration.
Where the state has enunciated a policy favoring arbitration, either by
statute or case law, that policy must be recognized as a significant factor
in the decisionmaking process of a court faced with a challenge to arbi-
tration. In adopting a policy favoring arbitration, the state has recog-
nized the benefits of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. 190
These benefits will be largely illusory if the scope of arbitration is severely
limited, not by contract but by the courts, and the finality of awards is
diminished by extensive court review.191 In deciding public policy based
challenges to arbitration, courts must recognize and consider the impor-
tant public policy favoring both collective bargaining 192 and dispute reso-
lution by final and binding arbitration. 193
In addition to statutory provisions mandating or authorizing griev-
ance arbitration, statutory provisions regarding the relationship of the
collective bargaining agreement to other laws indicate a policy favoring
collective bargaining and arbitration that must be taken into account by
courts faced with challenges to arbitration. Connecticut,1 94 Ohio, 1 95 and
Illinois,196 for example, have provisions giving the collective bargaining
agreement priority over other laws under certain conditions. In City of
190. The benefits of arbitration are enumerated supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
191. See Edwards, supra note 57, at 34; Ray, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1988). As stated by Professor Ray, "[t]he
problem of delay cannot be overstated." Id. at 12. "Delay caused by judicial review can cause
uncertainty, interfere with the bargaining process and undermine the union." Id.
192. Judge Edwards emphasizes that a broad public policy exception undermines the "explicit
public policy underlying the duty to bargain." Edwards, supra note 57, at 5. See discussion of this
issue infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text.
193. In AFSCME v. State, 124 III. 2d 246, 262, 529 N.E.2d 534, 541, 124 Ill. Dec. 553, 560
(1988), the court properly recognized the importance of the "public policy of promoting constructive
relationships between public employers and public employees, and the public policy which requires
finality in arbitration awards." See further discussion of AFSCME supra and infra notes 130-32 and
204-21 and accompanying text.
194. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (West 1989) provides that once the collective bargain-
ing agreement has been approved by the appropriate legislative body, it takes precedence over char-
ters, special acts, ordinances, and rules and regulations of the civil service commission or the
employer.
195. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.10 (Anderson 1980 Supp.) provides that agreements negoti-
ated pursuant to the bargaining law prevail over other laws except as otherwise specified by the
legislature. In State ex rel Rollins v. Board of Education, 10 Ohio St. 3d 123, 532 N.E.2d 1289
(1988), the Ohio Supreme Court held that the collective bargaining agreement prevailed over the
conflicting statute governing teacher tenure.
196. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 1615 (Smith-Hurd 1986), which covers public employees other
than educational employees, provides that in the event of conflict between the bargaining statute and
any other law, executive order or administrative regulation relating to wages, hours and conditions
of employment and employment relations, the bargaining statute and agreements negotiated there-
under control and prevail. Id. 1615 (a). The statute further states that the contract supersedes
contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules or regulations relating to wages, hours and conditions
of employment and employment relations adopted by the employer. Id. 1 1615 (b).
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DeKalb v. IAFF Local 1236,197 the Illinois Appellate Court declined to
consider the argument that the statutory provision giving the collective
bargaining agreement priority over other laws mandated upholding the
arbitrator's award against a claim that it conflicted with the Pension
Code, because the collective bargaining statute did not cover firefighters
at the time the grievance arose.198
Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that the statutory
provision for contractual supersedure of other laws upon approval of the
contract by the legislature was inoperative where the letter submitting
the contract for approval did not point out to the legislature the conflict
that was the basis for setting aside the arbitrator's award. 199 While these
statutory supersedure provisions have not frequently been a factor in
court decisions reviewing arbitration awards to date, they indicate a leg-
islative intent that collective bargaining agreements and arbitration
awards interpreting those agreements prevail over other laws to the ex-
tent indicated in the particular statute. These provisions further support
deferential judicial review and may play an increasingly significant role
in court decisions reviewing arbitration awards. 2°°
Not only do statutory provisions regarding arbitration support a
narrow reading of the public policy exception, but invalidation of arbitra-
tion awards on public policy grounds where no statute is violated sub-
verts the public policy favoring collective bargaining, for it allows the
employer to ignore contractual provisions and take unilateral action
without regard to the duty to bargain.20 1 Furthermore, in deciding such
cases, the courts are usurping the duty of the National Labor Relations
Board to determine mandatory subjects of bargaining. 20 2 Judge Edwards
illustrates these arguments with a private sector case,20 3 but a public sec-
tor case, AFSCME v. State of Illinois,2°4 equally exemplifies the
problems.
197. 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867, appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 106 (Ill. 1989).
198. The court did suggest, however, that the collective bargaining statute should not be broadly
read to supersede other laws. Id. at 375-76, 538 N.E.2d at 872-73.
199. Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, Local 1942, 179 Conn. 184,
197-98, 425 A.2d 1247, 1253-54 (1979).
200. The Illinois and Ohio statutes are relatively recent enactments, 1983 and 1984 respectively.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, 1601-27 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1987); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.01 -. 23 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1989).
201. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28. Judge Edwards analyzes this problem in the private sector
context, but it is equally applicable to the public sector.
202. Id. at 28. This argument applies equally to public sector administrative agencies charged
with the task of enforcing public sector collective bargaining laws.
203. Judge Edwards uses Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987), to illustrate his point. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28.
204. 124 11. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988).
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In AFSCME, the circuit court vacated an arbitration award that re-
instated two employees who were discharged for patient abuse based on
an unauthorized absence from the mental health facility in which they
worked, during which a patient in an area in which they did not work
died.20 5 The circuit court held that the award "represented a severe and
extreme departure from the public policy of Illinois, which is to protect
not to endanger mental patients. '2t ° If the employer refused to bargain
about the disciplinary penalty for employees accused of patient abuse, the
employer would have violated the statutory duty to bargain, for discipli-
nary penalties are within the scope of mandatory bargaining subjects. 20 7
Yet the employer in AFSCME accomplished the same result as if it had
refused to bargain altogether when it negotiated limitations on its right to
discipline for patient abuse but refused to comply with them, instead le-
gally challenging the arbitrator's award. The employer's refusal to com-
ply with the contract not only did not violate the law, but was
accomplished with the aid and sanction of the court. In effect, discipli-
nary penalties for patient abuse were removed from the scope of required
bargaining because the court gave the employer "an unfettered right (at-
tained outside of collective bargaining) to discharge employees who [en-
gage in patient abuse]", 208 despite the fact that the parties' contract as
interpreted by the arbitrator limited that right. Since the employer was
effectively given the right to take unilateral action with respect to disci-
plinary penalties for patient abuse, disciplinary penalties have been re-
moved from the scope of required bargaining.2 °9 This violates the public
policy favoring collective bargaining.
"The employer is left holding all the cards", 210 for the employer can
retain the employees if it so chooses, despite the court decision that their
reinstatement would violate public policy. Retention would not violate
the collective bargaining agreement or any express statutory provision,
and thus there would be no basis for any legal challenge to the em-
ployer's decision. Therefore, the enforcement of public policy is not allo-
cated to the courts, as supporters of a broad public policy exception
would urge. Instead, the employer retains control over whether or not
the public policy is enforced, thereby defeating the purpose of the public
205. Id. at 250-51, 529 N.E. 2d at 536. The circuit court's decision was reversed by the Illinois
Appellate Court. Id. at 250, 529 N.E.2d at 535.
206. Id. at 252, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
207. See City of Decatur v. AFSCME, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219.
208. Edwards, supra note 57, at 27.
209. See Allied Chem. Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 183-88 (1971) (em-
ployer can lawfully make unilateral changes with respect to permissive subjects of bargaining).
210. Edwards, supra note 57, at 28.
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policy exception. Accordingly, the circuit court in AFSCME thwarted
the public policy favoring collective bargaining to uphold a public policy,
protection of mental patients, which is enforceable only at the will of the
employer. The employer, and not the court, retains the right to decide
which public policy will be enforced and in what manner.
Because arbitration is "part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process, ' 211 the arbitrator is merely reading the contract for the parties,
giving meaning to the negotiated provisions or, if necessary, striking a
"supplementary bargain. ' 212 Accordingly, the arbitrator's award should
not be deemed to violate public policy unless the parties could not law-
fully have negotiated contract provisions identical to the terms of the
award.21 3 Put another way, "[t]he courts should only set aside arbitra-
tion awards where the award requires the employer to take some action
which, if taken by an employer on its own with no arbitral compulsion,
would violate the law." 214
It might be argued that in the public sector, the legislative body has
delegated to the employer, the Department of Mental Health in
AFSCME for example, the authority to determine public policy with re-
spect to its mission, care of the mentally ill.215 Thus, the arbitrator
should not be permitted to reject the employer's determination that pub-
lic policy requires the discharge of employees. This argument, however,
ignores the countervailing public policy favoring collective bargaining
and arbitration.2 16 So long as the legislature has authorized, indeed re-
quired, the employer to negotiate about the subject, and the employer has
agreed to binding arbitration, the arbitrator's judgment about the propri-
ety of discharge should be respected unless it conflicts with positive law
or requires the employer to violate the law. The employer can reserve to
itself the power to discharge employees without arbitral review through
negotiation. If it does not do so, then it has exercised its authority by
making employee terminations subject to the review of an arbitrator, as
permitted by law. Having made the decision, the public employer, like
the private employer should be bound by it so long as it violates no stat-
211. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
212. St. Antoine, supra note 28, at 1140; Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578, 581.
213. See Craver, supra note 1, at 43; Edwards, supra note 57, at 33; Hexter, supra note 43, at
107.
214. Hexter, supra note 43, at 107.
215. This argument was not addressed in AFSCME.
216. The validity of this argument also will depend on whether the statute on which the em-
ployer is relying is susceptible to an interpretation that the legislature committed to the employer the
discretion to make the relevant determinations of public policy. If the statute is sufficiently explicit
in committing the issue to the exclusive determination of the employer, then the award will be sub-
ject to rejection under the narrow public policy exception.
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ute, decisional law, or constitutional provision. 217
The example of AFSCME illustrates that broad public policy review
of arbitration awards in the public sector impinges on the collective bar-
gaining policy in the same manner as in the private sector. While in
some states the scope of bargaining in the public sector may be narrower
than under the National Labor Relations Act, this difference does not
support a broader public policy standard for review of arbitration
awards. If the arbitration award interferes with the employer's decision
on a matter which, by statute, the employer is prohibited from delegat-
ing, (i.e., an illegal subject of bargaining), then the award will be vacated
under a narrow public policy exception as contrary to law.218 If the
award deals with a mandatory bargaining subject, denial of enforcement
will interfere with the public policy favoring collective bargaining and
arbitration, as noted above, and the award should be upheld unless it is
contrary to law. If the award deals with a permissive subject of bargain-
ing,219 the same result should obtain. While overturning such an award
would not interfere with the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects, it
would frustrate the policy favoring arbitration, inviting "discord and dis-
trust and creat[ing] an atmosphere wherein a harmonious relationship
would virtually be impossible to maintain. 220 So long as there is no
express legal prohibition, the employer should be held to its bargain. 221
217. See Mahoning County Bd. of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities v. Mahon-
ing County TMR Educ. Ass'n, 22 Ohio St. 3d 80, 84, 488 N.E.2d 872, 876 (1986) where the court
stated:
The board argues, and the court of appeals decided, that collective bargaining agreements
are not as binding upon public employers as they are upon private employers. It is time to
put an end to that notion and categorically reject the argument. Today's decision gives
notice that negotiated collective bargaining agreements are just as binding upon public
employers as they are upon private employers.
218. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v. Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 777, 358
N.E.2d 878, 880, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (1976) (in reviewing arbitration award, court held that the
provision in the collective bargaining agreement which purported to relinquish the right of the
school board to terminate a probationary teacher without reasons was void as against public policy).
219. In some states, there is no permissive category of bargaining subjects. See, e.g., Ridgefield
Park Educ. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 162, 393 A.2d 278, 287 (1978)
(arbitration of grievances including transfers and reassignments was enjoined because the court did
not find the existence of a permissive category of negotiable matters in public employment labor
relations).
220. Pittsburgh Joint Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 481 Pa. 66, 74, 391 A.2d 1318,
1322 (1978). See Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139,
141 (Iowa 1983).
221. In Drivers Union Local 695 v. County of Sauk, 103 Wis. 2d 691, 310 N.W.2d 652 (1981),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court-, in refusing to vacate an arbitration award on public policy grounds,
noted:
It appears that the county's true complaint is that discipline and discharge of deputy sher-
iffs is subject to arbitration. This is a matter for the bargaining table or for the legislature,
and is not within the province of the court to decide in the course of reviewing an award
under ch. 788, Stats.
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Not only does a broad public policy exception interfere with collec-
tive bargaining policy, but it invites the court to substitute its views as to
the meaning of the contract for those of the arbitrator.222 Such judicial
activism is directly contrary to the principles underlying the policy favor-
ing arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, and will negate the
benefits of arbitration. 223
These same considerations support a narrow view of public policy in
deciding pre-arbitration disputes about legal arbitrability, for such dis-
putes are, in actuality, public policy challenges to arbitration presented
before, rather than after the award. Where a matter unequivocally has
been committed by the legislature to the exclusive determination of the
employer, arbitration should be denied as contrary to law. Courts must
engage in careful reading of statutory provisions, however, with particu-
lar attention to those dealing with matters of governmental policy that
affect the mission of the agency,224 to insure that the policy in favor of
arbitration is not unnecessarily trammeled by vague and archaic notions
of sovereignty. 225 A broad application of the nondelegability doctrine,
which results in a court holding inarbitrable grievances over issues ad-
dressed by other legislation regardless of whether such legislation evi-
dences a clear legislative commitment to exclusive governmental
decisionmaking, produces a broad public policy exception to judicial def-
erence to arbitration.226 For all of the reasons set forth, the broad public
222. Ray, supra note 191, at 34; Edwards, supra note 57, at 23. As Judge Edwards notes, "[a]ny
result-oriented judge who has a modicum of intelligence can find a perceived conflict between an
arbitrator's award and the judge's own notions of public policy." Id. at 34.
223. See supra notes 25-41, 174-80, 183-88 and accompanying text.
224. Craver, supra note 10, at 341.
225. By enacting a statute requiring government employers to bargain, the legislature has elimi-
nated the argument that the doctrine of sovereignty precludes compelling the employer to negotiate
an agreement and comply with the agreement negotiated. See K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING
LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 14-15 (1967).
226. While a complete discussion of the nondelegability doctrine is beyond the scope of this
article, the suggested approach to arbitrability determinations and arbitration enforcement requires
that the nondelegability doctrine be applied with care, in light of the negative consequences of broad
application for the system of collective bargaining and arbitration. Under this approach, the scope
of nondelegable subjects would be much narrower than many courts have found to date. Only an
unequivocal legislative declaration that a subject is committed exclusively to governmental determi-
nation should exempt a subject from negotiation and arbitration. Compare Board of Educ. v.
Areman, 41 N.Y.2d 527, 362 N.E.2d 943, 394 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1977) (Court affirmed trial court's
decision granting stay of arbitration where union sought to enforce contract clause which limited the
right of the Board of Education to inspect teacher personnel files based on the court's determination
that, despite the absence of any statutory prohibition on negotiation of such a clause, the Board of
Education had no authority to bargain away its right to review personnel files) with Board of Educ.
v. Philadelphia Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 96, 97, 101, 346 A.2d 35, 37, 40 (1975)
(Court affirmed the trial court's decision to compel arbitration of a dispute over the dismissal of a
nontenured teacher, holding that statutory provisions authorizing the school board to adopt and
enforce regulations regarding the conduct of teachers and to remove employees for various causes
did not create nondelegable duties that would prevent arbitration of the dismissal).
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policy exception is inconsistent with an effective system of collective bar-
gaining. Thus, courts faced with pre-arbitration challenges to arbi-
trability should order arbitration, applying the presumption in favor of
arbitrability, unless it is unquestionably clear that the arbitrator could
enter no award that would be consistent with the law. 227 The risk of
such a decision is small, for if the award issued conflicts with the law,
post-arbitration review of the award is available under the public policy
exception.
If the presumption of arbitrability causes a court to err, holding ar-
bitrable a dispute that the legislature intended to commit to the exclusive
determination of a public body, the error is subject to correction by the
legislature or the employer in negotiations. Subjects that in some states
have been held to be nondelegable duties of governmental bodies, in
others have been found to be proper subjects for arbitration.22  While it
is the role of each state's legislature to make such determinations, and
differences are to be expected, these differences demonstrate that irrepa-
rable damage to the public interest is unlikely to result from an erroneous
decision about legislative intent.
The governmental nature of the employer does not alone warrant
imposition of more stringent review of arbitration awards, because the
public interest may be implicated equally by the decision of a private or
public sector arbitrator. 229 An arbitral decision reinstating a bus driver
227. See, e.g., Board of Trustees, Prairie State College v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 173
Ill. App. 3d 395, 413, 527 N.E.2d 538, 550 (1988) (determination of possible conflicts with the
doctrine of nondelegability is best postponed until after the arbitration). For example, in cases in-
volving tenure and appointment determinations, several courts have held that considerations of
whether proper procedures have been followed in making such determinations are arbitrable,
although the ultimate decision is statutorily nondelegable. See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist. v.
Cohoes Teachers Ass'n, 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d 878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1976); School Comm. of
Peabody v. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 294, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 475 N.E.2d 410
(1985). In states where this is the law, a court should avoid enjoining arbitration over a tenure or
appointment decision on the assumption that the arbitrator will intrude improperly into the area of
nondelegable authority. Rather, the court should assume that the arbitrator will issue a lawful deci-
sion and allow the arbitration to proceed, subject to post-arbitration review if the arbitrator exceeds
his or her authority or violates the law by usurping the nondelegable power of the employer.
228. Compare Lake County Educ. Ass'n v. School Bd. of Lake County, 360 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App.) (arbitrator did not have the authority to evaluate a teacher's performance to deter-
mine if he had been fired for just cause because that determination was committed to the exclusive
authority of school board), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 882 (Fla. S. Ct. 1978) with Iowa City Community
School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139 (Iowa 1984) (arbitrator did not exceed
authority or violate public policy by evaluating a teacher's performance in order to award a salary
increase) and compare Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School Dist. v. Kaleva-Norman-Dickson School
Teachers Ass'n, 393 Mich. 583, 227 N.W.2d 500 (1975) (dispute involving nonrenewal of a proba-
tionary teacher's contract was arbitrable) with Cohoes City School Dist., 40 N.Y.2d 774, 358 N.E.2d
878, 390 N.Y.S.2d 53 (dispute involving nonrenewal of a probationary teacher's contract not
arbitrable).
229. "A railroad or a dock strike may be more damaging to a community than a 'job action' by
police". H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 25 (1971). There has been
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employed by a private company creates a greater risk to the public than a
decision reinstating a file clerk in the state department of transportation,
when both were discharged for coming to work intoxicated. In addition,
almost all employers, public and private, operate under one or more stat-
utory mandates that might be implicated by an arbitration decision. 230
Thus an argument that public employment per se requires a different
standard for arbitration enforcement because of the level of the public
interest cannot be sustained.
C. The Effect of the Statutory Context of Public Sector Employment
Law on Arbitration
The complex web of statutory regulation of the employment rela-
tionship in the public sector provides a more persuasive justification for a
greater court role in arbitration, for limited court involvement in arbitra-
tion may leave statutory interpretation to private decisionmakers. While
statutory regulation of employment in the private sector is increasing,231
public sector arbitration occurs in the context of an extensive network of
preexisting laws, ordinances, and regulations. When deciding an arbitra-
tion case, an arbitrator may be faced with statutory232 considerations in
several ways. First, the statute may be urged as informing the arbitrator
as to the meaning of the contractual provision which he or she is being
asked to interpret.233 Second, the statute may be incorporated in the
considerable scholarly commentary regarding the differences between collective bargaining in the
public sector and collective bargaining in the private sector. Much of the debate has focused on the
power of the union and the employees in the political decisionmaking process. See, e.g., Burton &
Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418, 427 (1970);
Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974); H. WEL-
LINGTON & R. WINTER, supra, at 7-32; Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is
Bargainable?, 51 OR. L. REV. 177 (1971). By enacting a collective bargaining statute and prescrib-
ing the appropriate scope of bargaining, however, each state legislature has determined the nature
and extent of power it is willing to give to unions and employees.
230. Edwards, supra note 57, at 32. Judge Edwards suggests, quite correctly, that a statute like
the Occupational Safety and Health Act which requires the employer to provide a safe work environ-
ment could provide the basis for setting aside numerous arbitration awards. Id.
231. D.E. FELLER, The Impact of External Law Upon Labor Arbitration in THE FUTURE OF
LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 83, 89 (1976).
232. For the sake of simplicity the article will refer to employment-related statutes, but ordi-
nances, rules and regulations also affect the arbitrator's decision in the same manner. Statutes pose
perhaps the most difficult legal issues for they have equal weight with the collective bargaining stat-
ute. See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
233. This argument may take the form of an assertion that the provision was negotiated to be
consistent with the statute and therefore has a particular meaning, or an assertion that, if the arbitra-
tor interprets the contract as urged by the other party, it will be unlawful. See, e.g., City of Miami v.
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 20, 94 Labor Arb. (BNA) 734 (1990) (Richard, Arb.) for an arbitra-
tion decision reflecting various arguments about the relationship of external law to the contract.
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contract and form the basis of the grievance. 2 3 4 Third, the parties may
ask the arbitrator for a decision based on the statute even where it is not
incorporated in the contract.235 Fourth, the arbitrator may consider and
decide a statutory issue even where not expressly authorized by the par-
ties.236 And finally, the arbitrator's decision may implicate a statute in a
manner that was neither argued by the parties nor considered by the
arbitrator.237
If the arbitrator relies on a statute to determine the meaning of the
contract, the arbitrator's award is an interpretation of the agreement, and
regardless of whether the arbitrator is correct about the meaning of the
statute, the award should be affirmed if it comports with the Trilogy stan-
dards and is not unlawful.23  Similarly, where the award implicates a
statute but does not consider and interpret the statute, the arbitrator is
not interpreting public law.239 The arbitrator in these situations is not
interpreting public law.
If the arbitrator is interpreting a statute directly, however, there are
different concerns because a private party's interpretation of public law
will be binding on the litigants. If the arbitrator's interpretation of the
statute results in an award that is contrary to law or requires the em-
ployer to violate the law, under either standard of review the award will
be vacated on public policy grounds. But it is certainly possible for an
arbitrator to interpret the law erroneously in a manner that leads to an
award that is not itself unlawful. Under these circumstances, review
under a narrow public policy standard would permit the arbitrator's er-
roneous view of the law to bind the parties.
City of Saginaw v. Michigan Law Enforcement Union24 is an exam-
ple of such a case. In Saginaw, the arbitrator considered a grievance
234. See Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads. The 'Common Law of the Shop' v. Exter-
nal Law, 32 ARB. J. 65, 79 (1977).
235. Id.
236. Feller, The Coming End ofArbitration's Golden Age, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 97, 110 (1976).
237. See Edwards, supra note 234, at 79.
238. Craver, supra note 10, at 349 & n.105. So long as the award does not violate the law,
erroneous conclusions of law do not warrant a refusal to enforce an award on public policy grounds.
See Fraternal Order of Police v. Bensinger, 122 Mich. App. 437, 448, 333 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1983).
Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, UFCW, 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845
(1985) applies this rule in a private sector case.
239. For example, if a city inspector is discharged for accepting a bribe, but reinstated by the
arbitrator on grounds of employer condonation, the arbitrator is not required to interpret a criminal
statute that makes acceptance of a bribe by an inspector a misdemeanor. While the employer may
urge the relevance of the statute as a basis for overturning the award on public policy grounds, a
narrow review of the award by the court does not abdicate to the arbitrator a question of statutory
interpretation.
240. 136 Mich. App. 542, 358 N.W.2d 356 (1984).
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alleging that the city's unpaid day off program, which was implemented
as a cost reduction measure, violated the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 241 The arbitrator found that the reduction in work for each em-
ployee was a reduction in the work force, because fewer employees were
scheduled to work.242 Thus the arbitrator held that the city had reduced
the work force for reasons of economy, and was required by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement to follow the specific provisions of the Michi-
gan civil service statute to implement the reduction. By failing to follow
the statute, the city breached the contract. 243 While the arbitration pro-
ceeding was pending, the county prosecutor filed an action in court to
enjoin the unpaid day off program on the ground that it violated the civil
service statute.2" In a decision directly contrary to the subsequent deci-
sion of the arbitrator, the judge found that the unpaid day off program
was not a reduction in the work force within the meaning of the statute,
and denied the injunction. After issuance of the arbitration award, the
city asked the same court that denied the injunction to vacate the arbitra-
tion award on the grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and
the award violated public policy. The court applied the deferential stan-
dard of the Trilogy, despite its prior contrary holding as to the meaning
of the statute, finding that the parties empowered the arbitrator to inter-
pret the statute by incorporating it in the agreement, and the court was
not authorized to substitute its judgment as to the interpretation of the
law for that of the arbitrator. The court also rejected the argument that,
by requiring layoffs to implement cost reductions, the award violated
public policy. 245 The court correctly concluded that the award merely
held that the unpaid day off program violated the contract and mandated
nothing with respect to other cost cutting actions by the city. 246
The court in Saginaw was appropriately deferential to the arbitra-
tor's decision, despite the fact that the interpretation of public law was
arguably erroneous. 247 The award was not contrary to law even though
the arbitrator may have erred in his interpretation of the statute. Ac-
cordingly, the court was not asked to enforce an unlawful contract. The
arbitrator's interpretation of the law was binding only on the parties to
241. 358 N.W.2d 357.
242. Id. at 358.
243. Id.
244. Id at 359.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 362.
247. The arbitrator's interpretation of the law may be correct, but given the court's contrary
interpretation of the same law with respect to the same facts, there is at least a plausible argument
that the arbitrator erred as to the law.
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the dispute and had no precedential effect. 248 While the court's pub-
lished decision enforcing the arbitration award might be cited by parties
in other cases as an authoritative statutory interpretation, the case is eas-
ily distinguished because it is based on arbitral deference. Any slight
increase in litigation that might be encouraged by the arbitrator's legal
interpretation is more than offset by the benefits of encouraging final res-
olution of contractual disputes by arbitration. As for the parties, any
misinterpretation by the arbitrator can be corrected through negotiations
for a subsequent collective bargaining agreement. 249
It is not uncommon in our legal system to allow a decisionmaking
body other than a court to rule on issues of law, subject to deferential
court review. Congress has entrusted to administrative agencies the au-
thority to interpret statutes, subject to limited court review.250 Like judi-
cial deference to arbitration decisions, judicial deference to
administrative agency decisions is not consistent,251 but both the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act and Supreme Court precedent support substan-
tial deference to agency decisions which are not contrary to the statute or
248. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,
680 (1986).
249. See Ray, supra note 191, at 12. Encouraging the parties to resolve the issue in negotiations
is consistent with the policy underlying collective bargaining statutes. Given the short term of most
labor agreements in the public sector, see Mitchell, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Compen-
sation in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 130 (B. Aaron, J. Grodin & J. Stem,
eds. 1979), it is unlikely that the parties will have to live with a highly objectionable award for any
length of time. Professor Ray points out, however, that resolution of the issue in collective bargain-
ing negotiations may be more difficult if extensive court review of arbitration awards results in court
proceedings that are not resolved prior to negotiations. Ray, supra note 191, at 12.
250. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45, reh'g
denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988); DAVIS, 5 AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 332 (1984); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 217 (1983). Agencies may interpret the law in
the course of rulemaking or adjudication. Id. at 214 & n. 115. While there is considerable scholarly
and legal debate about the appropriate and constitutional level of deference to administrative agency
decisions, see Dole v. United Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929, 938-39 (1990) (White, J. dissenting);
Redish, supra; Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469
(1985), courts currently, although not consistently, defer to agency legal interpretations where such
interpretations are not contrary to the statute. See, eg., Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476
U.S. 974 (1986) (FDA's decision not to enforce poisonous substance limit as to a crop of corn to be
used to feed livestock was not contrary to the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act); Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (FDA's refusal to bring an enforcement action to prohibit state use of
unapproved drugs for lethal injections was within its discretion).
251. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (Court declared that the
interpretation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by the Secretary of Health & Human
Services, which prohibited health care providers from discriminating against handicapped children,
was invalid); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Court held
invalid the Secretary of Labor's decision to reduce a toxic substance standard because it believed the
evidence linking the substance (benzene) to leukemia was insufficient).
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in excess of the authority delegated to the agency by Congress. 25 2 Simi-
lar deferential review of agency decisions by courts occurs at the state
level. 2
53
The rationale for deference to agency decisionmaking is similar to
the rationale for deference to arbitration. Both the agency and the arbi-
trator are chosen as decisionmakers because of their expertise. 254 Both
administrative adjudication and arbitration provide, at least in theory, a
method for resolving disputes that is less costly and quicker than litiga-
tion.255 Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is often defer-
ential; it can be more intrusive than review of arbitrators' decisions under
the Trilogy standards, however.256 Were administrative adjudication and
arbitration completely analogous, the administrative review standard
might be most appropriate for reviewing arbitration decisions, particu-
larly where such decisions involve legal as well as contractual ques-
252. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154 (1986) (Court upheld the Mass. Dep't of Public Wel-
fare's interpretation of the Medicaid Program of the Social Security Act because the Secretary of
Health & Human Services had granted the states flexibility in determining resource criteria for bene-
fits); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866, reh'g denied,
468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (Court deferred to EPA's interpretation because it is not the courts' responsi-
bility to "assess the wisdom of policy choices"); cases cited supra at note 250; Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
253. See, e.g., Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489, 490 (1986) (judicial review of
the decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles is very restricted and the
court may not retry the case or substitute its own judgment); Barone v. Department of Human
Services, 107 N.J. 355, 526 A.2d 1055 (1987) (court deferred to agency's decision to deny benefits to
petitioners as they exceeded the maximum allowable income).
254. See Redish, supra note 250, at 217; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960). It might be argued that arbitrators have no expertise in statutory interpre-
tation and therefore, their statutory interpretations, unlike their contractual interpretations should
be entitled to no deference. Many of the statutes that arbitrators are required to interpret, however,
are quite similar to collective bargaining provisions, eg., civil service rules and regulations regarding
discipline, and are not outside the competence of most arbitrators. See Edwards, Commentary, Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 680 (1986) (citing
Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 438-39 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and noting that under the Civil Service
Reform Act arbitrators are authorized to decide grievances based on laws, rules and regulations
covering federal employees). Furthermore, the parties who choose the arbitrator can select an arbi-
trator with legal expertise when the grievance deals with a legal issue. See Jones, supra note 115, at
889-93.
255. See Edwards, The Rising Workload and Perceived 'Bureaucracy' of the Federal Courts. A
Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REV. 871, 930-31
(1983).
256. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (an order by the NLRB
for petitioner to reinstate an employee was vacated and the case remanded, because the Court found
the evidence insufficient to support the Board's decision). In Universal Camera, the Court held that
the Board's decisions are to be judicially reviewed in the same manner as other administrative deci-
sions, allowing the courts to examine the evidence and to determine whether the agency's decision is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Id. at 480-90. Twenty years later, the
Court decided in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that in
addition to evidentiary review, the Court also must determine whether the administrative decision to




tions.257  There are important differences between arbitration and
adjudication, however, which justify less expansive court review of arbi-
tration awards.
First, the strong public policy in favor of arbitration supports more
limited court review of arbitration awards. Second, in arbitration the
forum for decision is chosen by the parties; in administrative adjudica-
tion the forum is chosen by the legislature. Even when a collective bar-
gaining statute requires that each contract contain an arbitration
procedure, the parties remain free to define the scope of arbitration and
limit arbitral determinations of external law. Thus, when the union and
the employer have chosen to commit the interpretation of a statute as it
relates to their particular dispute to an arbitrator, the court should re-
spect that choice in the absence of a decision which is clearly unlawful.
Third, as previously noted, the statutory interpretation in arbitration is
binding only on the parties to the dispute, who retain the power to cor-
rect the interpretation of the statute in any subsequent collective bargain-
ing agreements, 258 while a determination by an administrative agency as
to the meaning of the statute has much broader implications. Thus,
there is limited risk in allowing the arbitrator to interpret the law, subject
to limited court review, if the parties authorize such an interpretation.
The currently popular use of arbitration as a method of alternative
dispute resolution offers another example of a situation where issues of
law are decided in a nonjudicial forum. Arbitration is used to decide
issues of law in two related contexts-by agreement of the parties259 or
through mandatory court-annexed arbitration.260 The United States
Supreme Court has held that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are
enforceable unless the statute creating the cause of action precludes
waiver of a judicial forum.261 In considering this issue most recently, in
257. Judge Edwards suggests that where arbitration is used as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism outside the labor relations context and the arbitrator is deciding issues of law, a standard
of review analogous to administrative law would be more appropriate than the traditional deference
to arbitration in the labor arena. Edwards, supra note 255, at 931. See also Division 540, Amalga-
mated Transit Union v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245, 386 A.2d 1290, 98
L.R.R.M. 2526 (1978) where the court held that the administrative review standard should apply to
judicial review of an arbitration award where arbitration was compelled by statute. The award at
issue, however, was an interest arbitration award which set the terms and conditions of employment
rather than a grievance arbitration award.
258. In City of Saginaw v. Michigan Law Enforcement Union, 136 Mich. App. 542, 358 N.W.2d
356 (1984), for example, the employer could negotiate for the express authority in the collective
bargaining agreement to implement an unpaid day off program.
259. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) where the
Supreme Court approved the use of arbitration to decide a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.
260. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
261. See, e.g., Gilmer 111 S. Ct. at 1653, 59 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4409 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, the Court relied on the
"'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' "262 to force an
employee to arbitrate his statutory claim of age discrimination. 263 As a
registered securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), the employee had agreed to arbitation when required by the
NYSE rules. In enforcing the arbitration agreement, the Court noted
that "'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.' "264 The Court in
Gilmer evidenced little concern about private interpretation of public law
where there was no expressed intent by Congress to preclude arbitral
resolution of disputes under the statute. Further, the Court admonished
that in seeking Congressional intent regarding arbitration, "it should be
kept in mind that 'questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.' "265 Similar
considerations of policy should influence courts to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements providing for arbitration of statutory disputes in the
public sector.266
The use of mandatory court-annexed arbitration of legal disputes
also supports enforcement of labor arbitration agreements in the public
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (court upheld enforcement of agree-
ment to arbitrate claims based on antitrust law, interpreting the arbitration agreement to resolve
doubts regarding the scope of arbitrable claims in favor of arbitration); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (court enforced agreement to arbitrate claims
under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(court enforced agreement to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)).
262. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
263. See id. at 1657.
264. Id. at 1652 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
265. Id. at 1652 (quoting Moses H, Cone, 460 U. S. at 24). The Court also relied on Moses H.
Cone and on Warrior & Gulf in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S.
614 (1985), to support its conclusion that doubts regarding whether a party agreed to arbitrate an
issue "should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id. at
626 (quoting Moses H, Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24-25).
This policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, which is codified in the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), preempts the authority of the states to require a judicial
forum for resolution of claims that the parties agreed to arbitrate, even where those claims are
brought in state court and based on state statutory law. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984). While the United States Arbitration Act applies only to maritime contracts or contracts
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce", 9 U.S.C. § 2, the policies favoring arbitration con-
tained in state collective bargaining statutes should be given equal weight.
266. The Court in Gilmer rejected the argument that the inequality of bargaining power between
an employee and the employer required a determination that agreements to arbitrate employment
disputes should not be enforced. 111 S. Ct. at 1655. Where the employees are represented by a
union, the inequality of bargaining power should be diminished, further supporting enforcement of
arbitration agreements contained in collective bargaining agreements.
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sector. Like labor arbitration, court-annexed arbitration programs pro-
vide a rapid, inexpensive alternative to litigation 267 and reduce the work-
load of the courts.26 Although court-annexed arbitration procedures
typically provide for a trial de novo upon request of either party,269 in the
absence of appeal the arbitrator's decision interpreting the law is binding
on the parties.270
Thus, like the labor arbitrator, the arbitrator in a court-annexed sys-
tem makes a binding determination of law that may well be erroneous,
but stands in the absence of appeal. There is an apparent difference in
the finality of the arbitrator's decision in the two systems, however. The
decision in court-annexed arbitration becomes final only if the parties
decide to accept the arbitrator's determination and file no appeal. In la-
bor arbitration, the award is rendered final and binding by the court's
deferential review, over the objection of the party urging the court to set
aside the decision. Thus, one party to the labor arbitration is forced by a
deferential standard of review to accept a disputed private determination
of a legal issue. This difference is more apparent than real, however, for
there is no certainty that the parties' acceptance of the arbitrator's deci-
sion in court-annexed arbitration is based on satisfaction, rather than on
the inability to fund the cost of a second trial271 or the threat that a lesser
judgment in the trial would subject the party to paying the costs of the
arbitration272 or the appeal. 273
267. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 570 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Notably, the Kim-
brough court rejected the defendant's argument that arbitration constituted an improper delegation
of judicial functions to a nonjudicial officer, stating "[c]learly administrative agencies with similar
adjudicative responsibilities as the arbitration board have long been recognized as not only proper
but essential to the functioning of an efficient judicial system." Id. at 574 n.18.
268. In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 229, 112 A.2d 625, 629, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
The utility of the labor arbitration model for alternative dispute resolution in other contexts has been
the subject of debate. See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,
917, 933-34 (1979) (the success of labor arbitration is dependent on the unique aspects of the system
of collective bargaining and the role of unions in that system and cannot be transplanted successfully
to other arenas without significant alteration); Edwards, supra note 255, at 930-36 (while a wholesale
transfer of labor arbitration to other contexts may be inappropriate, the model is suggestive of the
possibilities for successful arbitration of disputes in other areas).
269. The provision for a trial de novo upon request protects the right to jury trial. See Kim-
brough, 478 F. Supp. at 567-71; Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d
932 (1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
270. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 567.
271. See Parker, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (by requiring the plaintiff to pay for two expensive
medical malpractice actions, frivolous appeals might be discouraged); Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d 491,
261 N.W.2d 434 (despite the expense involved in appearing before the patient compensation board,
the plaintiff still must bear the cost of a jury trial).
272. See Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 570 (requiring the challenger to pay for arbitration would
not penalize appeals).
273. See In re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 229, 112 A.2d 625 (1955) (initially, arbitration costs are paid
by the county, but must be repaid by the party that challenges the award). Significantly, a party also
may be bound by the result of the arbitration by refusal to participate in the hearing. New England
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Moreover, court-annexed arbitration is a compulsory pretrial
step,274 while the parties to labor arbitration have voluntarily submitted
their disputes to an arbitrator. The willingness to accept a compulsory
arbitration system which permits but discourages de novo trials should
indicate a corresponding willingness to defer to decisions of arbitrators
voluntarily chosen to decide contractual and legal issues, in the absence
of a decision which is clearly contrary to law.27 5 Both systems allow an
arbitrator to interpret statutes in resolving a dispute between two parties
and to issue a decision that is neither binding on, nor precedential for,
other litigants. The risk of erroneous interpretation of the law is thus
limited, and, in the case of labor arbitration is accepted willingly by the
parties.276
Based on the limited risk of an error of law, the narrow public policy
exception should be applied in reviewing decisions where the arbitrator
was required to consider and decide a statutory issue by the contract or
by the parties. Different considerations are implicated when the arbitra-
tor decides an issue of law without authorization from the contract or the
parties, however, because the authority of the arbitrator to decide any
issue is drawn solely from the parties. The appropriate judicial response
is not to broaden the public policy standard of review, however, but
rather to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority
pursuant to the traditional Trilogy or statutory standards.
This review of the various situations in which a public sector arbi-
trator might interpret the law demonstrates that no broader public policy
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (refusal barred party from
requesting a trial de novo).
274. See New England Merchants Nat7 Bank, 556 F. Supp. at 712; Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at
566; Parker, 483 Pa. at 106, 394 A.2d at 932. See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 3405 (McKinney
Supp. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 15 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1989). Notably, in New Eng-
land Merchants Nat'7 Bank, the court stated that a party who fails to participate in the arbitration
forfeits the right to demand a trial de novo. 556 F. Supp. at 715. Thus, the arbitration is not only
compulsory, but a party is bound by its result when he or she fails to attend the hearing.
275. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) where the
Supreme Court upheld against constitutional challenge based on Article III, a statutory scheme
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). The statute provided
for arbitral determinations of compensation for pesticide registrants by follow-on registrants using
the same data, with limited judicial review. As in the case of court-annexed arbitration, participa-
tion in the arbitration proceeding under FIFRA is not voluntary. In order to resolve compensation
disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation, the registrant must participate in arbitration.
276. A concern has been raised that subjecting statutory rights to arbitration might deprive indi-
viduals of their rights under statutes such as Titie VII of the Civil Rights Act. See, eg., Edwards,
supra note 234, at 76. This problem is not unique to the public sector, but applies in the private
sector as well. The solution is not broad judicial review of arbitration awards, but rather permitting
the individual to choose a statutory forum for vindication of those rights without requiring exhaus-
tion of the grievance procedure and without holding that arbitration bars subsequent litigation where
the statutory right cannot be vindicated appropriately in arbitration. This is the solution reached by
the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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standard is necessary in the public sector. Arbitration decisions that vio-
late the law or require a party to violate the law can and should be va-
cated, but in the absence of such illegality, public policy supports judicial
deference to arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
Restricted judicial involvement in labor arbitration in the public sec-
tor has the same benefits as in the private sector and poses no greater risk
to the public interest. Courts that are faced with arbitration issues in
public sector employment settings must put aside their reservations
about grievance arbitration and apply the Trilogy standards, including
the narrow public policy exception, in both pre-arbitration and post-arbi-
tration enforcement actions. Appropriate judicial deference to arbitra-
tion will insure that the full benefits of collective bargaining are realized
in the public sector.

